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Universal Ethics

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Also: Moral Core

Universal Ethics is a set of principles which apply to all humans, whether secular or religious, independent from any particular faith.


The compilation of Universal Ethics is not the base for a new religion: in particular it does not say anything about metaphysical or liturgical concepts of any kinds. That means that it does not give any explanation for the existence of the Universe (including the existence of man). It does not prescribe any particular ritual. It does not deal with the concept of God. It does not contain any myths, stories or immutable dogmas. Most importantly, Universal Ethics does not prescribe any formal changes for any existing or future creed.


Universal Ethics are a sort of Moral Constitution which is articulated as a set of specific ethical principles acceptable to all human beings. Under this ‘constitution’ all religions or secular groups can develop (or maintain) their own additional ethical principles.

Universal Ethics


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Guessing About our Moral Sense
Is there a biological basis for our moral agreements and behavior? -- This fragment is excerpted from Michael Gazzaniga's book, The Ethical Brian. 
Until recently, the possibility that our species has a built-in moral sense, a basic human capacity to make judgments about right and wrong, has been argued more by assertion and analysis of human behavior than by demonstrated biological fact.  Especially rare, if not missing entirely from the argument, has been the fact that we could not draw upon how the brain works in morally challenging situations.  Modern social scientists can get only so far in their efforts to understand human behavior.  James Q. Wilson used analysis of social science research in his classic 1993 book, The Moral Sense,  but admitted, "The truth, if it exists, is in the details . . . I am not trying to discover 'facts' that will prove 'values'; I am endeavoring to uncover the evolutionary, developmental, and cultural origins of our moral habits and our moral sense.  But in discovering these origins, I suspect that we will encounter uniformities; and by revealing uniformities, I think that we can better appreciate what is general, non-arbitrary, and emotionally compelling about human nature."(1)

Wilson, the distinguished political scientist from Harvard and now UCLA, suggested, "However much the scientific method is thought to be the enemy of morality, scientific findings provide substantial support for its existence and power."(2)  Wilson cast an astonishingly wide net to make his case for an innate human moral sense.  He reviewed not only the history of philosophy but also evolutionary theory, anthropology, criminology, psychology, and sociology. He concluded that no matter what intellectuals argue, there are certain universal, guiding moral instincts.  In fact, they are so instinctual that they often get overlooked:  "Much of the dispute over the existence of human universals has taken the form of a search for laws and stated practices.  But what is most likely to be universal are those impulses that, because they are so common, scarcely need to be stated in the form of a rule . . . "(3)  Highest among these are that all societies believe that murder and incest are wrong, that children are to be cared for and not abandoned, that we should not tell lies or break promises, and that we should be loyal to family. 

Wilson rejected the idea that morality is purely a social contract--that we are constrained by the need to behave a certain way because of external factors:  "For there to be a contract, whether to create a state or manage and exchange, there must first be a willingness to obey contracts; there must be in Durkheim's phrase, some non-contractual elements of contract."

Wilson may have been prescient.  A series of studies suggesting that there is a brain-based account of moral reasoning have burst onto the scientific scene.  

(1) Wilson, J. Q. (1993).  The Moral Sense (New York:  Free Press), p. 26.
(2) Ibid., p. xii.
(3) Ibid., p. 18. 

Guessing About our Moral Sense

Until recently, the possibility that our species has a built-in moral sense, a basic human capacity to make judgments about right and wrong, has been argued more by assertion and analysis of human behavior than by demonstrated biological fact.  Especially rare, if not missing entirely from the argument, has been the fact that we could not draw upon how the brain works in morally challenging situations.  Modern social scientists can get only so far in their efforts to understand human behavior.  James Q. Wilson used analysis of social science research in his classic 1993 book, The Moral Sense,  but admitted, "The truth, if it exists, is in the details . . . I am not trying to discover 'facts' that will prove 'values'; I am endeavoring to uncover the evolutionary, developmental, and cultural origins of our moral habits and our moral sense.  But in discovering these origins, I suspect that we will encounter uniformities; and by revealing uniformities, I think that we can better appreciate what is general, non-arbitrary, and emotionally compelling about human nature."(1)

Wilson, the distinguished political scientist from Harvard and now UCLA, suggested, "However much the scientific method is thought to be the enemy of morality, scientific findings provide substantial support for its existence and power."(2)  Wilson cast an astonishingly wide net to make his case for an innate human moral sense.  He reviewed not only the history of philosophy but also evolutionary theory, anthropology, criminology, psychology, and sociology. He concluded that no matter what intellectuals argue, there are certain universal, guiding moral instincts.  In fact, they are so instinctual that they often get overlooked:  "Much of the dispute over the existence of human universals has taken the form of a search for laws and stated practices.  But what is most likely to be universal are those impulses that, because they are so common, scarcely need to be stated in the form of a rule . . . "(3)  Highest among these are that all societies believe that murder and incest are wrong, that children are to be cared for and not abandoned, that we should not tell lies or break promises, and that we should be loyal to family. 

Wilson rejected the idea that morality is purely a social contract--that we are constrained by the need to behave a certain way because of external factors:  "For there to be a contract, whether to create a state or manage and exchange, there must first be a willingness to obey contracts; there must be in Durkheim's phrase, some non-contractual elements of contract."

Wilson may have been prescient.  A series of studies suggesting that there is a brain-based account of moral reasoning have burst onto the scientific scene.  

(1) Wilson, J. Q. (1993).  The Moral Sense (New York:  Free Press), p. 26.
(2) Ibid., p. xii.
(3) Ibid., p. 18. 
Source type: Book
The Ethical Brain
Page pp. 166-167
Published by Dana Press , New York , 2005
http://
Contribution #3521

Source (click to close)

Source type: Book
The Ethical Brain
Page pp. 166-167
Published by Dana Press , New York , 2005
http://
Contribution #3521


Which Rights Should be Universal?
Since there isn't a way to add resources to this site, I am putting this book description in the "essays" category. 
"We hold these truths to be self-evident..." So begins the U.S. Declaration of Independence. What follows those words is a ringing endorsement of universal rights, but it is far from self-evident. Why did the authors claim that it was? William Talbott suggests that they were trapped by a presupposition of Enlightenment philosophy: That there was only one way to rationally justify universal truths, by proving them from self-evident premises.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the authors of the U.S. Declaration had no infallible source of moral truth. For example, many of the authors of the Declaration of Independence endorsed slavery. The wrongness of slavery was not self-evident; it was a moral discovery.

In [Which Rights Should be Universal], William Talbott builds on the work of John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas, J.S. Mill, Amartya Sen, and Henry Shue to explain how, over the course of history, human beings have learned how to adopt a distinctively moral point of view from which it is possible to make universal, though not infallible, judgments of right and wrong. He explains how this distinctively moral point of view has led to the discovery of the moral importance of nine basic rights.

Undoubtedly, the most controversial issue raised by the claim of universal rights is the issue of moral relativism. How can the advocate of universal rights avoid being a moral imperialist? In this book, Talbott shows how to defend basic individual rights from a universal moral point of view that is neither imperialistic nor relativistic. Talbott avoids moral imperialism by insisting that all of us, himself included, have moral blindspots and that we usually depend on others to help us to identify those blindspots.

Talbott's book speaks to not only debates on human rights but to broader issues of moral and cultural relativism, and will interest a broad range of readers.

Which Rights Should be Universal?

"We hold these truths to be self-evident..." So begins the U.S. Declaration of Independence. What follows those words is a ringing endorsement of universal rights, but it is far from self-evident. Why did the authors claim that it was? William Talbott suggests that they were trapped by a presupposition of Enlightenment philosophy: That there was only one way to rationally justify universal truths, by proving them from self-evident premises.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the authors of the U.S. Declaration had no infallible source of moral truth. For example, many of the authors of the Declaration of Independence endorsed slavery. The wrongness of slavery was not self-evident; it was a moral discovery.

In [Which Rights Should be Universal], William Talbott builds on the work of John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas, J.S. Mill, Amartya Sen, and Henry Shue to explain how, over the course of history, human beings have learned how to adopt a distinctively moral point of view from which it is possible to make universal, though not infallible, judgments of right and wrong. He explains how this distinctively moral point of view has led to the discovery of the moral importance of nine basic rights.

Undoubtedly, the most controversial issue raised by the claim of universal rights is the issue of moral relativism. How can the advocate of universal rights avoid being a moral imperialist? In this book, Talbott shows how to defend basic individual rights from a universal moral point of view that is neither imperialistic nor relativistic. Talbott avoids moral imperialism by insisting that all of us, himself included, have moral blindspots and that we usually depend on others to help us to identify those blindspots.

Talbott's book speaks to not only debates on human rights but to broader issues of moral and cultural relativism, and will interest a broad range of readers.
Source type: Website
Oxford University Press
Unknown
http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/Political/?view=usa&ci=9780195331349
Viewed on June 11, 2009
Contribution #3294

Source (click to close)

Source type: Website
Oxford University Press
Unknown
http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/Political/?view=usa&ci=9780195331349
Viewed on June 11, 2009
Contribution #3294


Being Liberal in a Plural World
"if we cannot have consensus on the ‘truly universal’ values of liberalism, and hence rights—whether on empirical or practical grounds—how, and on what basis, should I as a liberal act in the world?"

Is ‘human rights’ a Western idea? Yes and no. Yes because the modern concept of human rights arose in the West during the Enlightenment. No because it is only the latest episode in the long human Asianvalues preoccupation with dignity, justice, compassion, and many localized personal and communitarian rights. But despite the UN General Assembly’s adoption and proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, consensus on what rights all humans deserve remains far from settled. 
I believe the question that underlies all debate on human rights is really this: What ideas, beliefs, and values—i.e., what common morality, and institutions for safeguarding it—ought to be promoted universally, and the rest left alone to the currents of diversity? The answer is far from easy and causes much acrimony (recall the ‘Asian values’ debate), with one side calling human rights a tool of Western hegemony aimed at non-Western societies, only to be accused in return of undermining liberty in the name of culture, order or tradition. Both sides make valid points. So what's a liberal to do? Let’s probe a little deeper.
2.

A great many of us today are ‘value pluralists.’ We believe that humans live by many legitimate ethical values and choices: to join the Resistance or care for a sick mother, to adopt a baby or make one, to support socialism or capitalism. Value pluralism entails that often there are no objective grounds for showing one human value superior to another, i.e., that there can be multiple right answers to a single ethical question. Value pluralism also implies that some values may be incommensurate with others, perhaps even making tragic conflict unavoidable—for instance, pro-life vs. pro-choice values, theocratic vs. secular values, warrior vs. monkish values. Often, conflicts of values are manifest even within a person. Whitman wrote, ‘I am large, I contain multitudes.’

Monk15 I think it is safe to say that a pluralism of values is an empirical fact and a central aspect of the human condition—there simply are many conceptions of ‘the good life’ that cannot be objectively ranked. A pluralist considers the values legitimate—though not necessarily equal—when they are recognizably human, including even the values of the Nazis, human-sacrificing Aztecs, and slave owning societies. They are recognizably human because: (a) in other circumstances, and given enough false beliefs, propaganda, or fear, we can imagine ourselves, or our friends, behaving likewise, or (b) though we despise the behavior, we can relate to the underlying value, say, the value Aztecs placed on regeneration and fertility, albeit via a mistaken institutional custom. On the other hand, pluralism would exclude, say, ‘someone who sees no difference between kicking a pebble and killing his family … because his values or purposes are literally incomprehensible.’ [1]

Contrast value pluralism with ‘ethical monism’—the view that every ethical question has one legitimate answer that is part of one superior moral system (such as utilitarianism, a moral law of God, or an ethics derived from Reason). If value pluralism is empirically true, then ethical monism is false and can be critiqued on empirical grounds. Note that ethical monism is an asymptotic state, that is, no one is a pure ethical monist but many are lured by the asymptote. Call them monist fundamentalists.

MaasaiWomen The opposite of ethical monism is ‘relativism’—the view that legitimate ethical values, especially in different cultural contexts, cannot be judged from an objective and/or universal standpoint—let alone a Western liberal standpoint that privileges individual liberty and human rights. Relativism treats Western liberalism as just one among many local value systems with no universal validity. It argues that others may prefer a different cocktail of values, say, autocratic rule, devotional piety, and traditional clan rights. Who is to say which is better? Note that relativism too is an asymptotic state: no one is a pure relativist but many are lured by the asymptote.

The question is, does pluralism imply relativism, and thus (or otherwise) undermine liberalism’s universal pretensions?

3.

Berlin Isaiah Berlin (1909-97), a significant exponent of liberal political thought in the 20th century, advanced the ideas of value pluralism and the two concepts of liberty: negative and positive. Though he often claimed that he was not a relativist, he didn’t adequately differentiate his pluralism from relativism, except in the most general terms.

Later thinkers have widely accepted his core ideas but have argued over whether or not a commitment to pluralism undermines liberalism, particularly in the debate over universal human rights and ‘Asian values.’ Among them is John Gray, a British philosopher, who believes that Berlin did not realize the full import of his value pluralism. While it does not imply full-blown cultural relativism, says Gray (though his arguments suggest otherwise), pluralism does undermine liberalism. He regards as monistic the absolute priority and universal relevance liberalism assigns to liberty. [2] The more Western liberals evangelize their conception of liberty and political rights for all humans, the more they veer away from pluralism to monism. Other cultures, he argues, have their own value systems that may not accord a privileged role to liberty.

How does one decide when one is being a pluralist and when a relativist?


for the rest of this essay, go to 3 Quarks Daily, Being Liberal in a Plural World.

Being Liberal in a Plural World

Is ‘human rights’ a Western idea? Yes and no. Yes because the modern concept of human rights arose in the West during the Enlightenment. No because it is only the latest episode in the long human Asianvalues preoccupation with dignity, justice, compassion, and many localized personal and communitarian rights. But despite the UN General Assembly’s adoption and proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, consensus on what rights all humans deserve remains far from settled. 
I believe the question that underlies all debate on human rights is really this: What ideas, beliefs, and values—i.e., what common morality, and institutions for safeguarding it—ought to be promoted universally, and the rest left alone to the currents of diversity? The answer is far from easy and causes much acrimony (recall the ‘Asian values’ debate), with one side calling human rights a tool of Western hegemony aimed at non-Western societies, only to be accused in return of undermining liberty in the name of culture, order or tradition. Both sides make valid points. So what's a liberal to do? Let’s probe a little deeper.
2.

A great many of us today are ‘value pluralists.’ We believe that humans live by many legitimate ethical values and choices: to join the Resistance or care for a sick mother, to adopt a baby or make one, to support socialism or capitalism. Value pluralism entails that often there are no objective grounds for showing one human value superior to another, i.e., that there can be multiple right answers to a single ethical question. Value pluralism also implies that some values may be incommensurate with others, perhaps even making tragic conflict unavoidable—for instance, pro-life vs. pro-choice values, theocratic vs. secular values, warrior vs. monkish values. Often, conflicts of values are manifest even within a person. Whitman wrote, ‘I am large, I contain multitudes.’

Monk15 I think it is safe to say that a pluralism of values is an empirical fact and a central aspect of the human condition—there simply are many conceptions of ‘the good life’ that cannot be objectively ranked. A pluralist considers the values legitimate—though not necessarily equal—when they are recognizably human, including even the values of the Nazis, human-sacrificing Aztecs, and slave owning societies. They are recognizably human because: (a) in other circumstances, and given enough false beliefs, propaganda, or fear, we can imagine ourselves, or our friends, behaving likewise, or (b) though we despise the behavior, we can relate to the underlying value, say, the value Aztecs placed on regeneration and fertility, albeit via a mistaken institutional custom. On the other hand, pluralism would exclude, say, ‘someone who sees no difference between kicking a pebble and killing his family … because his values or purposes are literally incomprehensible.’ [1]

Contrast value pluralism with ‘ethical monism’—the view that every ethical question has one legitimate answer that is part of one superior moral system (such as utilitarianism, a moral law of God, or an ethics derived from Reason). If value pluralism is empirically true, then ethical monism is false and can be critiqued on empirical grounds. Note that ethical monism is an asymptotic state, that is, no one is a pure ethical monist but many are lured by the asymptote. Call them monist fundamentalists.

MaasaiWomen The opposite of ethical monism is ‘relativism’—the view that legitimate ethical values, especially in different cultural contexts, cannot be judged from an objective and/or universal standpoint—let alone a Western liberal standpoint that privileges individual liberty and human rights. Relativism treats Western liberalism as just one among many local value systems with no universal validity. It argues that others may prefer a different cocktail of values, say, autocratic rule, devotional piety, and traditional clan rights. Who is to say which is better? Note that relativism too is an asymptotic state: no one is a pure relativist but many are lured by the asymptote.

The question is, does pluralism imply relativism, and thus (or otherwise) undermine liberalism’s universal pretensions?

3.

Berlin Isaiah Berlin (1909-97), a significant exponent of liberal political thought in the 20th century, advanced the ideas of value pluralism and the two concepts of liberty: negative and positive. Though he often claimed that he was not a relativist, he didn’t adequately differentiate his pluralism from relativism, except in the most general terms.

Later thinkers have widely accepted his core ideas but have argued over whether or not a commitment to pluralism undermines liberalism, particularly in the debate over universal human rights and ‘Asian values.’ Among them is John Gray, a British philosopher, who believes that Berlin did not realize the full import of his value pluralism. While it does not imply full-blown cultural relativism, says Gray (though his arguments suggest otherwise), pluralism does undermine liberalism. He regards as monistic the absolute priority and universal relevance liberalism assigns to liberty. [2] The more Western liberals evangelize their conception of liberty and political rights for all humans, the more they veer away from pluralism to monism. Other cultures, he argues, have their own value systems that may not accord a privileged role to liberty.

How does one decide when one is being a pluralist and when a relativist?


for the rest of this essay, go to 3 Quarks Daily, Being Liberal in a Plural World.

Source type: Website
3 Quarks Daily
Namit Arora
"Being Liberal in a Plural World"
http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2009/02/being-liberal-in-a-plural-world.html
Viewed on June 11, 2009
Contribution #3293

Source (click to close)

Source type: Website
3 Quarks Daily
Namit Arora
"Being Liberal in a Plural World"
http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2009/02/being-liberal-in-a-plural-world.html
Viewed on June 11, 2009
Contribution #3293


Anatomy of the Moral Faculty
This essay is an excerpt from the book, Moral Minds, by Marc Hauser, Director of the Cognitive Evolution Laboratory at Harvard.  Social psychologist Jonathan Haidt asserts that our moral instincts are directed primarily by our moral emotions.  His research supports this claim.  Hauser argues that that these moral emotions must be guided by a moral faculty that weighs the likely consequences of various actions, triggering the moral emotions. 
The classic view that dates back at least to Hume, . . . has been carried forward into the present by the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, who proposes that we are equipped with four families of moral emotions:  (1) other condemning: contempt, anger, and disgust; (2) self-conscious:  shame, embarrassment, and guilt; (3) other suffering: compassion; (4) other praising:  gratitude and elevation.  These moral emotions run the show.  They provide us with our intuitions about what is right or wrong, and what we should or shouldn't do.

it is impossible to deny that we experience guilt, compassion, and gratitude, and that these emotions materialize in our minds and bodies in the context of moral behavior, planned or imagined.  These experiences, however, leave open two questions:  What triggers these emotions and when do they arise in the course of moral evaluation?  For an emotion to emerge, something has to trigger it.  Some system in the brain must recognize a planned or completed action, and evaluate it in terms of its consequences.  When an emotion emerges in a context that we describe as morally relevant, the evaluative system has identified an action that often relates to human welfare, either one's own or someone else's.  The system that perceives action, breaking the apparently seamless flow of events into pieces with particular causes and consequences, must precede the emotions.   . . .

Our moral faculty enables each normally developing child to acquire any of the extant systems of morality.  Below is a rough sketch of the Rawlsian creature's moral anatomy--in essence its design specs.  [By Rawlsian creature, Hauser means a creature with an innate moral grammar via which recognition of causal relationships drive emotions.  He contrasts this with Kant's view that human morality is driven by a rational "Categorical Imperative" and Hume's view that emotions are primary -- that "reason serves passion."] . . .

ANATOMY OF THE RAWLSIAN CREATURE'S MORAL FACULTY

1.  The moral faculty consists of a set of principles that guide our moral judgments but do not strictly determine how we act.  The principles constitute the universal moral grammar, a signature of the species.

2.  Each principle generates an automatic and rapid judgment concerning whether an act or event is morally permissible, obligatory, or firbidden.

3.  The principles are inaccesible to conscious awareness.

4.  The principles operate on experiences that are independent of their sensory origins, including imagined and perceived visual scenes, auditory events, and all forms of language--spoken, signed, and written.

5.  The principles of the universal moral grammar are innate.

6.  Acquiring the native moral s;ystem is fast and effortless, requiring little to no instruction.  Experience with the native morality sets a series of parameters, giving birth to a specific moral system.

7.  The moral faculty constrains the range of both possible and stable ethical systems.

8.  Only the principles of our universal moral grammar are uniquely human and unique to the moral faculty.

9.  To function properly, the moral faculty must interface with other capacities of the mind (e.g. language, vision, memory, attention, emotion, beliefs), some unique to humans and some shared with other species.

10.  Because the moral faculty relies on specialized brain systems, damage to these systems can lead to selective deficits in moral judgments.  Damage to areas involved in supporting the moral faculty (e.g., emotions, memory) can lead to deficits in moral action--of what individuals actually do, as distinct from what they think someone else should or would do.

Features 1- 4 are largely descriptions of the mature state, what normal adults store in the form of unconscious and inaccessible moral knowledge.  Features 5-7 are largely developmental characteristics that define the problem of acquiring a system of moral knowledge, including signatures of the species and cultural influences.  Features 8-10 target evolutionary issues, including the uniqueness of our moral faculty and its evolved circuitry.  Overall this anatomical description provides a framework for characterizing our moral faculty.

[Hauser's book, Moral Minds, examines research relevant to each of these assertions.  For those interested in understanding universal ethics it offers a fascinating window into the human operating system and specifically the built-in dimensions of our ethical agreements.] 

Anatomy of the Moral Faculty

The classic view that dates back at least to Hume, . . . has been carried forward into the present by the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, who proposes that we are equipped with four families of moral emotions:  (1) other condemning: contempt, anger, and disgust; (2) self-conscious:  shame, embarrassment, and guilt; (3) other suffering: compassion; (4) other praising:  gratitude and elevation.  These moral emotions run the show.  They provide us with our intuitions about what is right or wrong, and what we should or shouldn't do.

it is impossible to deny that we experience guilt, compassion, and gratitude, and that these emotions materialize in our minds and bodies in the context of moral behavior, planned or imagined.  These experiences, however, leave open two questions:  What triggers these emotions and when do they arise in the course of moral evaluation?  For an emotion to emerge, something has to trigger it.  Some system in the brain must recognize a planned or completed action, and evaluate it in terms of its consequences.  When an emotion emerges in a context that we describe as morally relevant, the evaluative system has identified an action that often relates to human welfare, either one's own or someone else's.  The system that perceives action, breaking the apparently seamless flow of events into pieces with particular causes and consequences, must precede the emotions.   . . .

Our moral faculty enables each normally developing child to acquire any of the extant systems of morality.  Below is a rough sketch of the Rawlsian creature's moral anatomy--in essence its design specs.  [By Rawlsian creature, Hauser means a creature with an innate moral grammar via which recognition of causal relationships drive emotions.  He contrasts this with Kant's view that human morality is driven by a rational "Categorical Imperative" and Hume's view that emotions are primary -- that "reason serves passion."] . . .

ANATOMY OF THE RAWLSIAN CREATURE'S MORAL FACULTY

1.  The moral faculty consists of a set of principles that guide our moral judgments but do not strictly determine how we act.  The principles constitute the universal moral grammar, a signature of the species.

2.  Each principle generates an automatic and rapid judgment concerning whether an act or event is morally permissible, obligatory, or firbidden.

3.  The principles are inaccesible to conscious awareness.

4.  The principles operate on experiences that are independent of their sensory origins, including imagined and perceived visual scenes, auditory events, and all forms of language--spoken, signed, and written.

5.  The principles of the universal moral grammar are innate.

6.  Acquiring the native moral s;ystem is fast and effortless, requiring little to no instruction.  Experience with the native morality sets a series of parameters, giving birth to a specific moral system.

7.  The moral faculty constrains the range of both possible and stable ethical systems.

8.  Only the principles of our universal moral grammar are uniquely human and unique to the moral faculty.

9.  To function properly, the moral faculty must interface with other capacities of the mind (e.g. language, vision, memory, attention, emotion, beliefs), some unique to humans and some shared with other species.

10.  Because the moral faculty relies on specialized brain systems, damage to these systems can lead to selective deficits in moral judgments.  Damage to areas involved in supporting the moral faculty (e.g., emotions, memory) can lead to deficits in moral action--of what individuals actually do, as distinct from what they think someone else should or would do.

Features 1- 4 are largely descriptions of the mature state, what normal adults store in the form of unconscious and inaccessible moral knowledge.  Features 5-7 are largely developmental characteristics that define the problem of acquiring a system of moral knowledge, including signatures of the species and cultural influences.  Features 8-10 target evolutionary issues, including the uniqueness of our moral faculty and its evolved circuitry.  Overall this anatomical description provides a framework for characterizing our moral faculty.

[Hauser's book, Moral Minds, examines research relevant to each of these assertions.  For those interested in understanding universal ethics it offers a fascinating window into the human operating system and specifically the built-in dimensions of our ethical agreements.] 
Source type: Book
Moral Minds: The Nature of Right and Wrong
Page 52-54
Published by Ecco - Harper Collins , New York , 2006
http://www.amazon.com/Moral-Minds-Nature-Right-Wrong/dp/006078072X
Contribution #3158

Source (click to close)

Source type: Book
Moral Minds: The Nature of Right and Wrong
Page 52-54
Published by Ecco - Harper Collins , New York , 2006
http://www.amazon.com/Moral-Minds-Nature-Right-Wrong/dp/006078072X
Contribution #3158


A New Science of Virtues
This is a request for research proposals from the University of Chicago.  I am posting it here because it raises fascinating and wonderful questions about what virtue means and how it functions, questions that take into consideration both our biology and our history. 

We hope that this RFP will encourage the most creative new scholarship on virtues. Thus, we do not specify too rigidly in advance exactly which questions and topics may ultimately be pursued. However, it is nonetheless important that the enterprise is well-grounded and sensitive to a wide range of research questions and findings that are currently being discussed. Below, we propose seven broad overlapping themes as a framework for possible areas of inquiry. These may be seen as subthemes of this RFP’s central question: In what ways might the humanities and the sciences cooperate to develop richer understandings of virtue for modern societies.

1. Virtue and the Sciences: What do the insights into humans, that are emerging from the best scientific research, tell us about the nature of virtue? What contribution does science make to our appreciation and understanding of virtue? For example, what might neuroscience and psychology tell us about the difference between reckless risk-taking and, by contrast, moral courage? How can the human sciences and philosophy take account of the findings from scientific knowledge? In what ways do historical and philosophical notions of virtue influence scientific inquiry? Can we find innovative ways to model the impact of the virtues on individuals and societies?

2. Virtue and Evolutionary Biology/Genetics: Are there innate “learning modules” that incline growing children to be sensitive to cultural and religious codes dealing with more conservative-sounding virtues such as loyalty, respect for authority, and purity-sanctity? Have humans evolved with certain virtues or are they strictly cultural constructs? If there is an evolutionary basis for virtue, how does it function to protect or preserve the species? Are there identifiable virtues that are strictly cultural or that, by contrast, have clear biological bases?

3. Virtue and Society: In what ways do social contexts (political, economic, anthropological, legal, ecological) bear on, limit, or support the virtues? Why does virtue remain vital, necessary, and important to human society? What happens when societies abandon the virtues? What happens when societies distort and demean the virtues? What is the role of virtue in a democracy? How does science and scholarship on virtue inform social programs and public policies that touch on virtue? How do we think about virtues in political theory in view of the differentiated spheres of life in modern societies? How do we prevent distortion and misuse of the virtues?

4. Virtue and Human Development: What are the models of virtue that have been thought of in human history that could be revived, refined, and recontextualized for today? What new models might come from this effort? How do such models open up a variety of definitional issues? How do they relate to a variety of other concepts such as habits, character, morality in general, principle, and the intuitive aspects of life? What roles do exemplars play in instantiating virtues? How are virtues inculcated? What role does biology play in the formation of virtue? Brain processes? Psycho-sexual development? Spirituality and religious formation? Schooling? The family? The wider civil society?

5. Virtue and Modernity: How do we think about virtue in light of modernity and the relative autonomy of different spheres of life? Do cross-cultural studies of virtue reveal measurable differentiation from societies that invented the classic models of virtue in the past? How do history, anthropology and sociology work together to show that spheres of life are divided in ways that were utterly foreign to the contexts in which the virtues were first adumbrated and elaborated? In this context, is it best to think in the singular—a science of virtue—or, perhaps, in the plural, a science of the virtues? Does this research open up new ways of thinking about virtue or better enable us to analyze our own context? Are virtues contextually and temporally bound?

6. Philosophical and Theological Conceptions of Virtue: To what extent do virtues stand alone as moral entities or to what extent do they gain their fuller meaning in the context of the larger moral systems within which they are located? How do virtues relate to the larger narratives that shape a religious or cultural tradition? How do they relate to moral principles, e.g., the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative, various utilitarian principles, etc., if at all? Does a theory of virtue or virtues require a theory of goods in the premoral sense and if so, from what source (tradition, science, both) do we learn about what goods are worth pursuing? Can scientific research methods be useful in clarifying ancient debates on particular moral systems?

7. Specific Virtues: One potentially fruitful strategy for bringing many of these questions together might be to concretely examine one important virtue from a variety of angles. Candidates for comprehensive consideration might include courage, humility, purpose, honesty, altruism, duty, responsibility, thrift, tenacity, self-reliance, generosity, loyalty, or integrity. What is fundamental or foundational to human beings and to a decent human society about this virtue? How is this virtue inculcated? Who are the vital, living exemplars of this virtue? What are the social, psychological and biological impacts of this virtue? Why are such models or exemplars important? How is the virtue exemplified in the lives of individuals and in the lives of collectivities?

Again, these themes are meant to be illustrative and many lines of inquiry may prove valuable and lead to important insights. We also welcome proposals from other areas. Indeed, we would recommend that researchers keep in mind basic questions such as:
How are the virtues understood?
Why is virtue important?
Is a science of virtue a useful construct? Why or why not?
How do we know a virtue when we see one?

We encourage projects that demonstrate appropriate and reasonable degrees of attention to both sides of the understanding of science articulated above. Obviously, some proposals will emphasize one aspect more than the other, but all proposals should in some way attempt to bridge the space between the humanities and the natural sciences on the subject of virtue.

If you have any questions, we encourage you to contact:

Brenda Huskey,
Associate Director, Interdisciplinary Programs
The University of Chicago Arete Initiative
5848 South University Avenue Chicago IL 60637
Email: virtues@uchicago.edu


A New Science of Virtues

We hope that this RFP will encourage the most creative new scholarship on virtues. Thus, we do not specify too rigidly in advance exactly which questions and topics may ultimately be pursued. However, it is nonetheless important that the enterprise is well-grounded and sensitive to a wide range of research questions and findings that are currently being discussed. Below, we propose seven broad overlapping themes as a framework for possible areas of inquiry. These may be seen as subthemes of this RFP’s central question: In what ways might the humanities and the sciences cooperate to develop richer understandings of virtue for modern societies.

1. Virtue and the Sciences: What do the insights into humans, that are emerging from the best scientific research, tell us about the nature of virtue? What contribution does science make to our appreciation and understanding of virtue? For example, what might neuroscience and psychology tell us about the difference between reckless risk-taking and, by contrast, moral courage? How can the human sciences and philosophy take account of the findings from scientific knowledge? In what ways do historical and philosophical notions of virtue influence scientific inquiry? Can we find innovative ways to model the impact of the virtues on individuals and societies?

2. Virtue and Evolutionary Biology/Genetics: Are there innate “learning modules” that incline growing children to be sensitive to cultural and religious codes dealing with more conservative-sounding virtues such as loyalty, respect for authority, and purity-sanctity? Have humans evolved with certain virtues or are they strictly cultural constructs? If there is an evolutionary basis for virtue, how does it function to protect or preserve the species? Are there identifiable virtues that are strictly cultural or that, by contrast, have clear biological bases?

3. Virtue and Society: In what ways do social contexts (political, economic, anthropological, legal, ecological) bear on, limit, or support the virtues? Why does virtue remain vital, necessary, and important to human society? What happens when societies abandon the virtues? What happens when societies distort and demean the virtues? What is the role of virtue in a democracy? How does science and scholarship on virtue inform social programs and public policies that touch on virtue? How do we think about virtues in political theory in view of the differentiated spheres of life in modern societies? How do we prevent distortion and misuse of the virtues?

4. Virtue and Human Development: What are the models of virtue that have been thought of in human history that could be revived, refined, and recontextualized for today? What new models might come from this effort? How do such models open up a variety of definitional issues? How do they relate to a variety of other concepts such as habits, character, morality in general, principle, and the intuitive aspects of life? What roles do exemplars play in instantiating virtues? How are virtues inculcated? What role does biology play in the formation of virtue? Brain processes? Psycho-sexual development? Spirituality and religious formation? Schooling? The family? The wider civil society?

5. Virtue and Modernity: How do we think about virtue in light of modernity and the relative autonomy of different spheres of life? Do cross-cultural studies of virtue reveal measurable differentiation from societies that invented the classic models of virtue in the past? How do history, anthropology and sociology work together to show that spheres of life are divided in ways that were utterly foreign to the contexts in which the virtues were first adumbrated and elaborated? In this context, is it best to think in the singular—a science of virtue—or, perhaps, in the plural, a science of the virtues? Does this research open up new ways of thinking about virtue or better enable us to analyze our own context? Are virtues contextually and temporally bound?

6. Philosophical and Theological Conceptions of Virtue: To what extent do virtues stand alone as moral entities or to what extent do they gain their fuller meaning in the context of the larger moral systems within which they are located? How do virtues relate to the larger narratives that shape a religious or cultural tradition? How do they relate to moral principles, e.g., the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative, various utilitarian principles, etc., if at all? Does a theory of virtue or virtues require a theory of goods in the premoral sense and if so, from what source (tradition, science, both) do we learn about what goods are worth pursuing? Can scientific research methods be useful in clarifying ancient debates on particular moral systems?

7. Specific Virtues: One potentially fruitful strategy for bringing many of these questions together might be to concretely examine one important virtue from a variety of angles. Candidates for comprehensive consideration might include courage, humility, purpose, honesty, altruism, duty, responsibility, thrift, tenacity, self-reliance, generosity, loyalty, or integrity. What is fundamental or foundational to human beings and to a decent human society about this virtue? How is this virtue inculcated? Who are the vital, living exemplars of this virtue? What are the social, psychological and biological impacts of this virtue? Why are such models or exemplars important? How is the virtue exemplified in the lives of individuals and in the lives of collectivities?

Again, these themes are meant to be illustrative and many lines of inquiry may prove valuable and lead to important insights. We also welcome proposals from other areas. Indeed, we would recommend that researchers keep in mind basic questions such as:
How are the virtues understood?
Why is virtue important?
Is a science of virtue a useful construct? Why or why not?
How do we know a virtue when we see one?

We encourage projects that demonstrate appropriate and reasonable degrees of attention to both sides of the understanding of science articulated above. Obviously, some proposals will emphasize one aspect more than the other, but all proposals should in some way attempt to bridge the space between the humanities and the natural sciences on the subject of virtue.

If you have any questions, we encourage you to contact:

Brenda Huskey,
Associate Director, Interdisciplinary Programs
The University of Chicago Arete Initiative
5848 South University Avenue Chicago IL 60637
Email: virtues@uchicago.edu


Source type: Website
University of Chicago - Arete Initiative
http://scienceofvirtues.org/arete/Topics.aspx
Viewed on February 21, 2009
Contribution #3108

Source (click to close)

Source type: Website
University of Chicago - Arete Initiative
http://scienceofvirtues.org/arete/Topics.aspx
Viewed on February 21, 2009
Contribution #3108


Raising Moral Kids: Wisdom Commons-A Sprout from Seeds of Compassion

As parents, we want our children to be happy. We want them to achieve great things. But we also want them to be good people. We want to be as proud of their kindness, generosity and integrity as we are of their achievements. How do we help them get there?

Moral development

Research shows us that healthy human children come into the world primed to become moral members of society, just like they come into the world primed to acquire language. Moral emotions, such as empathy, shame and guilt, begin to show their presence during the toddler years. A toddler may pat an injured peer, or offer a grubby toy to an adult who is distressed. A preschooler may hide in the closet to cover a transgression. As a child learns to think, moral emotions are joined by moral reasoning. By age 5 or 6, they can argue long and loud about fairness.

Even so, kids don’t learn to be decent human beings without adult input any more than they learn to communicate without adult input. For a child to grow into an honest adult, for example, we have to model honesty, expect it and explicitly teach it.

Virtue and morality

One way to think about moral development is that bad behavior is simply the absence of virtue. When a child hurts another, it may be that their internal sense of kindness, patience or self-control has fallen short. When they sneak or steal, it means their internal sense of honesty wasn’t as strong as the external temptation.

Rather than making the bad behavior itself the focus of our attention and conversations with them, we can put our energy toward helping them to grow good qualities. This is not to say that bad behavior never needs labels and consequences. Rather, every time our child “crashes” is an opportunity to explain and encourage the virtues we are trying to cultivate.

The Wisdom Commons

The Wisdom Commons, an interactive Web project that sprouted out of Seeds of Compassion, offers parents and educators a new tool for teaching about positive character traits. The Wisdom Commons is structured around a set of approximately 100 virtues that human beings generally agree are important, such as generosity, compassion and courage. As a way of promoting these virtues (and showcasing how widely they are valued), the Web site houses a library of more than 3,000 quotes, stories and other bits of wisdom from around the world.

Once registered on the site, you can click your favorite bits of wisdom to collect them in a “Personal Wisdom Page.” Soon you’ll be able to turn your collection into Mom’s or Dad’s Book of Common Wisdom, a print-on-demand book in which you can mix your collection with photos and a personal dedication. One easy way to find bits of wisdom that are meaningful to you is to sign up for the “Daily Wisbit” sent out to members who request it.

Ideas for parents

  • Choose a “virtue of the week” to discuss at the dinner table. Why does this virtue matter? How is it honored in your family’s spiritual or cultural tradition? How have family members demonstrated this virtue recently? When have they seen it in other people?
  • Ask each child to find a quote that they really like. Have them read it to other family members and explain why they like it.
  • Make a game of reading bits of wisdom aloud together and giving each one a rating, thus prompting whatever discussion is needed to reach a family agreement or average.
  • Find a special quote each week that reflects your family’s values. Click the printer icon after the quote to print it out as an 8½ x 11 poster. Put it on the fridge.
  • Create a Wisdom Page and begin storing bits of wisdom you want to share with your kids. Alternately, create a shared family Wisdom Page together, with input from everyone.

When our kids start leading us

After watching me work on the Wisdom Commons with a team of software engineers and the wonderful volunteers who contributed the first 1,000 bits of wisdom to the site, my middle-school-age daughters, Brynn and Marley, gave me a birthday present. Each of them adopted a virtue (justice and aspiration, respectively). They registered to create wisdom pages of their own and spent a morning researching their chosen virtues and entering quotes and poems they liked.

Then they went back to their other interests, or so I thought. Imagine my surprise and delight last month when I clicked on my “Daily Wisbit” email from the Commons and found a poem about confidence, secretly penned by Brynn.

Our children not only learn from us about what it means to be good, loving, effective people, they also teach us — if we are willing to be taught. But it’s up to us to open the conversation.


Valerie Tarico, Ph.D., is a psychologist and author in Seattle, and founder of WisdomCommons.org. She is also the mother of two middle-school-age girls.

Raising Moral Kids: Wisdom Commons-A Sprout from Seeds of Compassion

As parents, we want our children to be happy. We want them to achieve great things. But we also want them to be good people. We want to be as proud of their kindness, generosity and integrity as we are of their achievements. How do we help them get there?

Moral development

Research shows us that healthy human children come into the world primed to become moral members of society, just like they come into the world primed to acquire language. Moral emotions, such as empathy, shame and guilt, begin to show their presence during the toddler years. A toddler may pat an injured peer, or offer a grubby toy to an adult who is distressed. A preschooler may hide in the closet to cover a transgression. As a child learns to think, moral emotions are joined by moral reasoning. By age 5 or 6, they can argue long and loud about fairness.

Even so, kids don’t learn to be decent human beings without adult input any more than they learn to communicate without adult input. For a child to grow into an honest adult, for example, we have to model honesty, expect it and explicitly teach it.

Virtue and morality

One way to think about moral development is that bad behavior is simply the absence of virtue. When a child hurts another, it may be that their internal sense of kindness, patience or self-control has fallen short. When they sneak or steal, it means their internal sense of honesty wasn’t as strong as the external temptation.

Rather than making the bad behavior itself the focus of our attention and conversations with them, we can put our energy toward helping them to grow good qualities. This is not to say that bad behavior never needs labels and consequences. Rather, every time our child “crashes” is an opportunity to explain and encourage the virtues we are trying to cultivate.

The Wisdom Commons

The Wisdom Commons, an interactive Web project that sprouted out of Seeds of Compassion, offers parents and educators a new tool for teaching about positive character traits. The Wisdom Commons is structured around a set of approximately 100 virtues that human beings generally agree are important, such as generosity, compassion and courage. As a way of promoting these virtues (and showcasing how widely they are valued), the Web site houses a library of more than 3,000 quotes, stories and other bits of wisdom from around the world.

Once registered on the site, you can click your favorite bits of wisdom to collect them in a “Personal Wisdom Page.” Soon you’ll be able to turn your collection into Mom’s or Dad’s Book of Common Wisdom, a print-on-demand book in which you can mix your collection with photos and a personal dedication. One easy way to find bits of wisdom that are meaningful to you is to sign up for the “Daily Wisbit” sent out to members who request it.

Ideas for parents

  • Choose a “virtue of the week” to discuss at the dinner table. Why does this virtue matter? How is it honored in your family’s spiritual or cultural tradition? How have family members demonstrated this virtue recently? When have they seen it in other people?
  • Ask each child to find a quote that they really like. Have them read it to other family members and explain why they like it.
  • Make a game of reading bits of wisdom aloud together and giving each one a rating, thus prompting whatever discussion is needed to reach a family agreement or average.
  • Find a special quote each week that reflects your family’s values. Click the printer icon after the quote to print it out as an 8½ x 11 poster. Put it on the fridge.
  • Create a Wisdom Page and begin storing bits of wisdom you want to share with your kids. Alternately, create a shared family Wisdom Page together, with input from everyone.

When our kids start leading us

After watching me work on the Wisdom Commons with a team of software engineers and the wonderful volunteers who contributed the first 1,000 bits of wisdom to the site, my middle-school-age daughters, Brynn and Marley, gave me a birthday present. Each of them adopted a virtue (justice and aspiration, respectively). They registered to create wisdom pages of their own and spent a morning researching their chosen virtues and entering quotes and poems they liked.

Then they went back to their other interests, or so I thought. Imagine my surprise and delight last month when I clicked on my “Daily Wisbit” email from the Commons and found a poem about confidence, secretly penned by Brynn.

Our children not only learn from us about what it means to be good, loving, effective people, they also teach us — if we are willing to be taught. But it’s up to us to open the conversation.


Valerie Tarico, Ph.D., is a psychologist and author in Seattle, and founder of WisdomCommons.org. She is also the mother of two middle-school-age girls.

Source type: Website
Valerie Tarico
"Parent Map - Giving Back - January 1, 2009"
http://www.parentmap.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1164&Itemid=1
Viewed on February 13, 2009
Contribution #3087

Source (click to close)

Source type: Website
Valerie Tarico
"Parent Map - Giving Back - January 1, 2009"
http://www.parentmap.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1164&Itemid=1
Viewed on February 13, 2009
Contribution #3087


Monkeys Making Moral Decisions
Many people think of evolution as peaking with humans. We picture our own species as the greatest achievement of and ultimate reason for billions of years of evolution. This way of thinking-- the idea (in this case, of evolution) as making positive progress and being purposeful, is called "teleology".

While this perspective may be deeply appealing intuitively, it is a misunderstanding of biology. In the broadest sense, evolution means "change"- a change in the genetic frequencies of a gene pool. This is not the same as "improvement" in the gene pool. Those kind of value statements don't make sense in a biological context, because in biology, "success" is defined genetically, and is entirely intertwined with and accorded by an organism's environment. What succeeds in a harsh winter might not in an especially mild one. (This relationship, between the organism and its environment, is what is considered "ecology".)

Among countless other justifications for this belief that humans are the pinnacle, and entire point of the existance of planet earth, we point to our own reason, and our morality. We intuitively feel that these abilities are uniquely ours, and are largely what sets us apart.* "Beasts merely act on their instincts!", it is explained. One of the problems with this perspective is that it relies on uninformed assumptions, rather than real knowledge and understanding of what other animals' capacities are. For some reason, just because we see might see animals in the zoo, or in a photograph, we tend to feel fully authoritative of their capacities and limitations.

However, according to at least one involving empathy, and an awareness of other's pain, humans actually tested much worse in morality than another group of primates.

In a laboratory setting, macaques were fed if they were willing to pull a chain and electrically shock an unrelated macaque whose agony was in plain view through a one-way mirror. Otherwise, they starved. After learning the ropes, the monkeys frequently refused to pull the chain; in one experiment only 13% would do so - 87% preferred to go hungry. One macaque went without food for nearly two weeks rather than hurt its fellow. Macaques who had themselves been shocked in previous experiments were even less willing to pull the chain. The relative social status or gender of the macaques had little bearing on their reluctance to hurt others.

"If the circumstances were reversed, and captive humans were offered the same deal by macaque scientists, would we do as well? (Especially when there is an authority figure urging us to administer the electric shocks, we humans are disturbingly willing to cause pain - and for a reward much more paltry than food is for a starving macaque [cf. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental Overview].)

The study mentioned at the end is a famous one, performed after World War II, where humans, if directed to do so by an authority figure, were to found to willingly induce shock and torture. Horrifyingly, we saw random human beings, as ordinary as you or me- were complicit and at times eager to induce intense pain on others of our species, simply because they were told to by a man in a lab coat.

I am not claiming that these two studies, where the macaque monkeys acted "humane", and the humans acted, well, worse than "brutes", are the last word in characterizing entire species. I also understand the studies are not identical. However, I do think that these findings have the potential to grease the hinges of mental shutters and let in some light and air to our previous, and, I might add, gravely self-serving assumptions regarding the character and potential of our own and other species. To learn of monkeys who steadfastly refused to torture unrelated others, and even turned down enormous personal reward, (ie. relief from starvation) can perhaps lead us to question inherent entitlements due us as a species. Perhaps such insights could work to move us off an increasingly shaky pedestal of righteous morality.

If we humans are at all moral as we fancy ourselves to be, this sort of shift would probably be an indicator of said morality. We'd start to see that non-human animals are not only capable of feeling intense pain, but also feeling intense empathy and concern for pain in others. Perhaps we'd reconsider categories of who and what we are in relation to other species, and what is acceptable treatment of them. As our our understanding of other animals changes, will our moral consideration of and responsibilities towards them, as well?


* We tend to overstate not only our unique morality, but also our own (mythical) rationality. The western philosophical heritage emphasizes this now outdated stance- traditionally we've aligned ourselves with God and the angels (and, thereby, rationality and morality!), and regarded other animals as fundamentally different creatures.


**The book Good Natured: The Origins of Good and Evil in Humans and other Animals is devoted to examining the continuum of morality across species.

Monkeys Making Moral Decisions

Many people think of evolution as peaking with humans. We picture our own species as the greatest achievement of and ultimate reason for billions of years of evolution. This way of thinking-- the idea (in this case, of evolution) as making positive progress and being purposeful, is called "teleology".

While this perspective may be deeply appealing intuitively, it is a misunderstanding of biology. In the broadest sense, evolution means "change"- a change in the genetic frequencies of a gene pool. This is not the same as "improvement" in the gene pool. Those kind of value statements don't make sense in a biological context, because in biology, "success" is defined genetically, and is entirely intertwined with and accorded by an organism's environment. What succeeds in a harsh winter might not in an especially mild one. (This relationship, between the organism and its environment, is what is considered "ecology".)

Among countless other justifications for this belief that humans are the pinnacle, and entire point of the existance of planet earth, we point to our own reason, and our morality. We intuitively feel that these abilities are uniquely ours, and are largely what sets us apart.* "Beasts merely act on their instincts!", it is explained. One of the problems with this perspective is that it relies on uninformed assumptions, rather than real knowledge and understanding of what other animals' capacities are. For some reason, just because we see might see animals in the zoo, or in a photograph, we tend to feel fully authoritative of their capacities and limitations.

However, according to at least one involving empathy, and an awareness of other's pain, humans actually tested much worse in morality than another group of primates.

In a laboratory setting, macaques were fed if they were willing to pull a chain and electrically shock an unrelated macaque whose agony was in plain view through a one-way mirror. Otherwise, they starved. After learning the ropes, the monkeys frequently refused to pull the chain; in one experiment only 13% would do so - 87% preferred to go hungry. One macaque went without food for nearly two weeks rather than hurt its fellow. Macaques who had themselves been shocked in previous experiments were even less willing to pull the chain. The relative social status or gender of the macaques had little bearing on their reluctance to hurt others.

"If the circumstances were reversed, and captive humans were offered the same deal by macaque scientists, would we do as well? (Especially when there is an authority figure urging us to administer the electric shocks, we humans are disturbingly willing to cause pain - and for a reward much more paltry than food is for a starving macaque [cf. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental Overview].)

The study mentioned at the end is a famous one, performed after World War II, where humans, if directed to do so by an authority figure, were to found to willingly induce shock and torture. Horrifyingly, we saw random human beings, as ordinary as you or me- were complicit and at times eager to induce intense pain on others of our species, simply because they were told to by a man in a lab coat.

I am not claiming that these two studies, where the macaque monkeys acted "humane", and the humans acted, well, worse than "brutes", are the last word in characterizing entire species. I also understand the studies are not identical. However, I do think that these findings have the potential to grease the hinges of mental shutters and let in some light and air to our previous, and, I might add, gravely self-serving assumptions regarding the character and potential of our own and other species. To learn of monkeys who steadfastly refused to torture unrelated others, and even turned down enormous personal reward, (ie. relief from starvation) can perhaps lead us to question inherent entitlements due us as a species. Perhaps such insights could work to move us off an increasingly shaky pedestal of righteous morality.

If we humans are at all moral as we fancy ourselves to be, this sort of shift would probably be an indicator of said morality. We'd start to see that non-human animals are not only capable of feeling intense pain, but also feeling intense empathy and concern for pain in others. Perhaps we'd reconsider categories of who and what we are in relation to other species, and what is acceptable treatment of them. As our our understanding of other animals changes, will our moral consideration of and responsibilities towards them, as well?


* We tend to overstate not only our unique morality, but also our own (mythical) rationality. The western philosophical heritage emphasizes this now outdated stance- traditionally we've aligned ourselves with God and the angels (and, thereby, rationality and morality!), and regarded other animals as fundamentally different creatures.


**The book Good Natured: The Origins of Good and Evil in Humans and other Animals is devoted to examining the continuum of morality across species.
Source type: Website
Lizzie Pickard
"Blog: Teardrop Souffle, April 22, 2006"
http://teardropsouffle.blogspot.com/
Viewed on December 30, 2008
Contribution #2816

Source (click to close)

Source type: Website
Lizzie Pickard
"Blog: Teardrop Souffle, April 22, 2006"
http://teardropsouffle.blogspot.com/
Viewed on December 30, 2008
Contribution #2816


Subjations
Subjations is an emotion theory based on subjects and relations. 
Subject - a cross-utilized unit of a relation
Relation - more than one subject combined together
Extrinsic Subject - subject given to a relation
Intrinsic Subject - subject contained in a relation
Right - if a subject is within an extrinsic subject
Wrong - if a subject is not within an extrinsic subject
Possession - if an intrinsic subject is within a subject
Good - what increases a relation
Bad - what hinders or decreases a relation
Horror - excessive Bad
Serious - being within an extrinsic subject, also known as relevant
Silly - happiness that is not within an extrinsic subject
Crazy - if an extrinsic subject is ambiguous
Confusion - if the choice of an extrinsic subject is ambiguous
Value - direction of a relation
Like - to share values

Happiness - occurs if subjects combine and form a relation. There are five different types of happiness. In order to include non-social relations in these definitions, the generic term combination is used symbolized with the letter 'C'.

1stC - occurs when subjects combine and a relation is formed. Here the extrinsic subject is created. The terms 'more' and 'less' do not apply with 1stC. It is very important to clarify that with 1stC one does not say, "Happiness is the combination of subjects," but, "Happiness occurs if subjects combine and form a relation."

2ndC - occurs when subjects are combined to an existing relation. Here the extrinsic subject already exists. The terms 'more' and 'less' apply with 2ndC. Leverage and contentment exist because of 2ndC.

3rdC - occurs as the back and forth dynamics between relations. Here more than one extrinsic subject is involved.

Leverage - resembles a lever, the relative lowering of a subject in a relation causes the relative increase of the other related subjects. This also is known as antipathetic happiness. Subjects on opposite sides of the lever are antipathetic to each other. An examples of this is kidding.

Contentment - is a relative position a subject has in a relationship. This position is what we mean when we say we are "happy". Another term that applies here is "fashion". Fashion is the active form of contentment. This type of happiness is personal and can be stronger than 1stC. Some sub-emotions of contentment are:

Enjoyment - having what you want (having what gives you contentment) *
Grief - not having what you want *
Frustration - not getting what you want
Anger - excessive Frustration
Distress - having what you don't want*
Relief - not having what you don't want*

Unhappiness is, of course, the converse but with separation instead of combination.

Sorry - empathetic Unhappiness
Regret - the action toward Sorry
Gratitude - the action toward antipathetic Happiness
Forgive - declaring Unhappiness to be irrelevant
Blame - declaring Unhappiness to be relevant

Nervous - anticipation of a combination
Shy - excessive Nervousness
Worry - anticipation of a separation
Concern - mild Worry
Fear - excessive Worry
Terror - extreme Fear
Anxiety - general term for Nervous, Shy, Worry, Concern, Fear or Terror

Pride - above Contentment
Shame - below Contentment
Dignity - empathetic Pride
Arrogance, Conceit - excessive Dignity
Honor - the action toward Dignity
Jealousy - antipathetic Pride
Envy - the action toward Jealousy
Respect - antipathetic Pride related to Fashion
Admiration - the action toward Respect
Modesty - empathetic Shame
Humility - the action toward Modesty
Pity - antipathetic Shame
Pathetic, Pitiful, Contempt - excessive Pity
Disgust - the action toward Pity
Expectation - future Contentment
Hope - the action toward Expectation (to want a future Contentment)
Standard - past Contentment
Surprise - empathetically or antipathetically above Standard or Expectation Embarrassment - empathetically below Standard or Expectation
Disappointment - antipathetically below Standard or Expectation
Ecstatic - excessive Surprise
Sadness - excessive Disappointment or Embarrassment
Hate - excessive antipathy
Love - excessive empathy
Miss - absent empathy

Axiom: Extrinsic subjects can never be related intrinsic subjects. Such an event would instantly cause a new extrinsic subject to exist. This is called "The League Rule" or "The Authority Rule."

Axiom: Related subjects do not combine for the same reason that unrelated subjects do not separate. This is called "The Base Rule". It is a significant factor in morality.

*The definitions for Enjoyment, Grief, Distress and Relief are from I. Roseman 1984. Cognitive determinants of emotion: a structured theory. In P. Shaver (ed.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 5: Emotions, relationships, and health). Beverly-Hills: Sage, 11-36.

Subjations

Subject - a cross-utilized unit of a relation
Relation - more than one subject combined together
Extrinsic Subject - subject given to a relation
Intrinsic Subject - subject contained in a relation
Right - if a subject is within an extrinsic subject
Wrong - if a subject is not within an extrinsic subject
Possession - if an intrinsic subject is within a subject
Good - what increases a relation
Bad - what hinders or decreases a relation
Horror - excessive Bad
Serious - being within an extrinsic subject, also known as relevant
Silly - happiness that is not within an extrinsic subject
Crazy - if an extrinsic subject is ambiguous
Confusion - if the choice of an extrinsic subject is ambiguous
Value - direction of a relation
Like - to share values

Happiness - occurs if subjects combine and form a relation. There are five different types of happiness. In order to include non-social relations in these definitions, the generic term combination is used symbolized with the letter 'C'.

1stC - occurs when subjects combine and a relation is formed. Here the extrinsic subject is created. The terms 'more' and 'less' do not apply with 1stC. It is very important to clarify that with 1stC one does not say, "Happiness is the combination of subjects," but, "Happiness occurs if subjects combine and form a relation."

2ndC - occurs when subjects are combined to an existing relation. Here the extrinsic subject already exists. The terms 'more' and 'less' apply with 2ndC. Leverage and contentment exist because of 2ndC.

3rdC - occurs as the back and forth dynamics between relations. Here more than one extrinsic subject is involved.

Leverage - resembles a lever, the relative lowering of a subject in a relation causes the relative increase of the other related subjects. This also is known as antipathetic happiness. Subjects on opposite sides of the lever are antipathetic to each other. An examples of this is kidding.

Contentment - is a relative position a subject has in a relationship. This position is what we mean when we say we are "happy". Another term that applies here is "fashion". Fashion is the active form of contentment. This type of happiness is personal and can be stronger than 1stC. Some sub-emotions of contentment are:

Enjoyment - having what you want (having what gives you contentment) *
Grief - not having what you want *
Frustration - not getting what you want
Anger - excessive Frustration
Distress - having what you don't want*
Relief - not having what you don't want*

Unhappiness is, of course, the converse but with separation instead of combination.

Sorry - empathetic Unhappiness
Regret - the action toward Sorry
Gratitude - the action toward antipathetic Happiness
Forgive - declaring Unhappiness to be irrelevant
Blame - declaring Unhappiness to be relevant

Nervous - anticipation of a combination
Shy - excessive Nervousness
Worry - anticipation of a separation
Concern - mild Worry
Fear - excessive Worry
Terror - extreme Fear
Anxiety - general term for Nervous, Shy, Worry, Concern, Fear or Terror

Pride - above Contentment
Shame - below Contentment
Dignity - empathetic Pride
Arrogance, Conceit - excessive Dignity
Honor - the action toward Dignity
Jealousy - antipathetic Pride
Envy - the action toward Jealousy
Respect - antipathetic Pride related to Fashion
Admiration - the action toward Respect
Modesty - empathetic Shame
Humility - the action toward Modesty
Pity - antipathetic Shame
Pathetic, Pitiful, Contempt - excessive Pity
Disgust - the action toward Pity
Expectation - future Contentment
Hope - the action toward Expectation (to want a future Contentment)
Standard - past Contentment
Surprise - empathetically or antipathetically above Standard or Expectation Embarrassment - empathetically below Standard or Expectation
Disappointment - antipathetically below Standard or Expectation
Ecstatic - excessive Surprise
Sadness - excessive Disappointment or Embarrassment
Hate - excessive antipathy
Love - excessive empathy
Miss - absent empathy

Axiom: Extrinsic subjects can never be related intrinsic subjects. Such an event would instantly cause a new extrinsic subject to exist. This is called "The League Rule" or "The Authority Rule."

Axiom: Related subjects do not combine for the same reason that unrelated subjects do not separate. This is called "The Base Rule". It is a significant factor in morality.

*The definitions for Enjoyment, Grief, Distress and Relief are from I. Roseman 1984. Cognitive determinants of emotion: a structured theory. In P. Shaver (ed.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 5: Emotions, relationships, and health). Beverly-Hills: Sage, 11-36.
Source type: Website
John Huber
"Subjations"
http://subjectsandrelations.com
Viewed on December 10, 2008
Contribution #2798

Source (click to close)

Source type: Website
John Huber
"Subjations"
http://subjectsandrelations.com
Viewed on December 10, 2008
Contribution #2798


Excerpt fromWhat Makes People Vote Republican?
Psychologist Jonathan Haidt compares two moral systems that he calls: Millian (after John Stuart Mill) and Durkheimian (after sociologist Emile Durkheim).  One is based in the Enlightenment ideals; the other emerges from the actual functioning of moral prescriptions across a range of cultures.  Haidt argues that "morality is not just about how we treat each other (as most liberals think); it is also about binding groups together, supporting essential institutions, and living in a sanctified and noble way."
 . . .

I began to study morality and culture at the University of Pennsylvania in 1987. A then-prevalent definition of the moral domain, from the Berkeley psychologist Elliot Turiel, said that morality refers to "prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other." But if morality is about how we treat each other, then why did so many ancient texts devote so much space to rules about menstruation, who can eat what, and who can have sex with whom? There is no rational or health-related way to explain these laws. (Why are grasshoppers kosher but most locusts are not?) The emotion of disgust seemed to me like a more promising explanatory principle. The book of Leviticus makes a lot more sense when you think of ancient lawgivers first sorting everything into two categories: "disgusts me" (gay male sex, menstruation, pigs, swarming insects) and "disgusts me less" (gay female sex, urination, cows, grasshoppers ).

For my dissertation research, I made up stories about people who did things that were disgusting or disrespectful yet perfectly harmless. For example, what do you think about a woman who can't find any rags in her house so she cuts up an old American flag and uses the pieces to clean her toilet, in private? Or how about a family whose dog is killed by a car, so they dismember the body and cook it for dinner? I read these stories to 180 young adults and 180 eleven-year-old children, half from higher social classes and half from lower, in the USA and in Brazil. I found that most of the people I interviewed said that the actions in these stories were morally wrong, even when nobody was harmed. Only one group—college students at Penn—consistently exemplified Turiel's definition of morality and overrode their own feelings of disgust to say that harmless acts were not wrong. (A few even praised the efficiency of recycling the flag and the dog).

This research led me to two conclusions. First, when gut feelings are present, dispassionate reasoning is rare. In fact, many people struggled to fabricate harmful consequences that could justify their gut-based condemnation. I often had to correct people when they said things like "it's wrong because… um…eating dog meat would make you sick" or "it's wrong to use the flag because… um… the rags might clog the toilet." These obviously post-hoc rationalizations illustrate the philosopher David Hume's dictum that reason is "the slave of the passions, and can pretend to no other office than to serve and obey them." This is the first rule of moral psychology: feelings come first and tilt the mental playing field on which reasons and arguments compete. If people want to reach a conclusion, they can usually find a way to do so. The Democrats have historically failed to grasp this rule, choosing uninspiring and aloof candidates who thought that policy arguments were forms of persuasion.

The second conclusion was that the moral domain varies across cultures. Turiel's description of morality as being about justice, rights, and human welfare worked perfectly for the college students I interviewed at Penn, but it simply did not capture the moral concerns of the less elite groups—the working-class people in both countries who were more likely to justify their judgments with talk about respect, duty, and family roles. ("Your dog is family, and you just don't eat family.") From this study I concluded that the anthropologist Richard Shweder was probably right in a 1987 critique of Turiel in which he claimed that the moral domain (not just specific rules) varies by culture. Drawing on Shweder's ideas, I would say that the second rule of moral psychology is that morality is not just about how we treat each other (as most liberals think); it is also about binding groups together, supporting essential institutions, and living in a sanctified and noble way.

 . . . . .

On Turiel's definition of morality ("justice, rights, and welfare"), Christian and Hindu communities don't look good. They restrict people's rights (especially sexual rights), encourage hierarchy and conformity to gender roles, and make people spend extraordinary amounts of time in prayer and ritual practices that seem to have nothing to do with "real" morality. But isn't it unfair to impose on all cultures a definition of morality drawn from the European Enlightenment tradition? Might we do better with an approach that defines moral systems by what they do rather than by what they value?

Here's my alternative definition: morality is any system of interlocking values, practices, institutions, and psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible. It turns out that human societies have found several radically different approaches to suppressing selfishness, two of which are most relevant for understanding what Democrats don't understand about morality.

First, imagine society as a social contract invented for our mutual benefit. All individuals are equal, and all should be left as free as possible to move, develop talents, and form relationships as they please. The patron saint of a contractual society is John Stuart Mill, who wrote (in On Liberty) that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." Mill's vision appeals to many liberals and libertarians; a Millian society at its best would be a peaceful, open, and creative place where diverse individuals respect each other's rights and band together voluntarily (as in Obama's calls for "unity") to help those in need or to change the laws for the common good.

Psychologists have done extensive research on the moral mechanisms that are presupposed in a Millian society, and there are two that appear to be partly innate. First, people in all cultures are emotionally responsive to suffering and harm, particularly violent harm, and so nearly all cultures have norms or laws to protect individuals and to encourage care for the most vulnerable. Second, people in all cultures are emotionally responsive to issues of fairness and reciprocity, which often expand into notions of rights and justice. Philosophical efforts to justify liberal democracies and egalitarian social contracts invariably rely heavily on intuitions about fairness and reciprocity.

But now imagine society not as an agreement among individuals but as something that emerged organically over time as people found ways of living together, binding themselves to each other, suppressing each other's selfishness, and punishing the deviants and free-riders who eternally threaten to undermine cooperative groups. The basic social unit is not the individual, it is the hierarchically structured family, which serves as a model for other institutions. Individuals in such societies are born into strong and constraining relationships that profoundly limit their autonomy. The patron saint of this more binding moral system is the sociologist Emile Durkheim, who warned of the dangers of anomie (normlessness), and wrote, in 1897, that "Man cannot become attached to higher aims and submit to a rule if he sees nothing above him to which he belongs. To free himself from all social pressure is to abandon himself and demoralize him." A Durkheimian society at its best would be a stable network composed of many nested and overlapping groups that socialize, reshape, and care for individuals who, if left to their own devices, would pursue shallow, carnal, and selfish pleasures. A Durkheimian society would value self-control over self-expression, duty over rights, and loyalty to one's groups over concerns for outgroups.

A Durkheimian ethos can't be supported by the two moral foundations that hold up a Millian society (harm/care and fairness/reciprocity). My recent research shows that social conservatives do indeed rely upon those two foundations, but they also value virtues related to three additional psychological systems: ingroup/loyalty (involving mechanisms that evolved during the long human history of tribalism), authority/respect (involving ancient primate mechanisms for managing social rank, tempered by the obligation of superiors to protect and provide for subordinates), and purity/sanctity (a relatively new part of the moral mind, related to the evolution of disgust, that makes us see carnality as degrading and renunciation as noble). These three systems support moralities that bind people into intensely interdependent groups that work together to reach common goals. Such moralities make it easier for individuals to forget themselves and coalesce temporarily into hives, a process that is thrilling, as anyone who has ever "lost" him or herself in a choir, protest march, or religious ritual can attest.

 . . . . .

Religion and political leadership are so intertwined across eras and cultures because they are about the same thing: performing the miracle of converting unrelated individuals into a group. Durkheim long ago said that God is really society projected up into the heavens, a collective delusion that enables collectives to exist, suppress selfishness, and endure. The three Durkheimian foundations (ingroup, authority, and purity) play a crucial role in most religions. When they are banished entirely from political life, what remains is a nation of individuals striving to maximize utility while respecting the rules. What remains is a cold but fair social contract, which can easily degenerate into a nation of shoppers.


For full essay which uses these moral distinctions to examine the priorities of liberal and conservative Americans, go to The Edge.  Commentary and related essays are available there as well. 

Excerpt fromWhat Makes People Vote Republican?

 . . .

I began to study morality and culture at the University of Pennsylvania in 1987. A then-prevalent definition of the moral domain, from the Berkeley psychologist Elliot Turiel, said that morality refers to "prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other." But if morality is about how we treat each other, then why did so many ancient texts devote so much space to rules about menstruation, who can eat what, and who can have sex with whom? There is no rational or health-related way to explain these laws. (Why are grasshoppers kosher but most locusts are not?) The emotion of disgust seemed to me like a more promising explanatory principle. The book of Leviticus makes a lot more sense when you think of ancient lawgivers first sorting everything into two categories: "disgusts me" (gay male sex, menstruation, pigs, swarming insects) and "disgusts me less" (gay female sex, urination, cows, grasshoppers ).

For my dissertation research, I made up stories about people who did things that were disgusting or disrespectful yet perfectly harmless. For example, what do you think about a woman who can't find any rags in her house so she cuts up an old American flag and uses the pieces to clean her toilet, in private? Or how about a family whose dog is killed by a car, so they dismember the body and cook it for dinner? I read these stories to 180 young adults and 180 eleven-year-old children, half from higher social classes and half from lower, in the USA and in Brazil. I found that most of the people I interviewed said that the actions in these stories were morally wrong, even when nobody was harmed. Only one group—college students at Penn—consistently exemplified Turiel's definition of morality and overrode their own feelings of disgust to say that harmless acts were not wrong. (A few even praised the efficiency of recycling the flag and the dog).

This research led me to two conclusions. First, when gut feelings are present, dispassionate reasoning is rare. In fact, many people struggled to fabricate harmful consequences that could justify their gut-based condemnation. I often had to correct people when they said things like "it's wrong because… um…eating dog meat would make you sick" or "it's wrong to use the flag because… um… the rags might clog the toilet." These obviously post-hoc rationalizations illustrate the philosopher David Hume's dictum that reason is "the slave of the passions, and can pretend to no other office than to serve and obey them." This is the first rule of moral psychology: feelings come first and tilt the mental playing field on which reasons and arguments compete. If people want to reach a conclusion, they can usually find a way to do so. The Democrats have historically failed to grasp this rule, choosing uninspiring and aloof candidates who thought that policy arguments were forms of persuasion.

The second conclusion was that the moral domain varies across cultures. Turiel's description of morality as being about justice, rights, and human welfare worked perfectly for the college students I interviewed at Penn, but it simply did not capture the moral concerns of the less elite groups—the working-class people in both countries who were more likely to justify their judgments with talk about respect, duty, and family roles. ("Your dog is family, and you just don't eat family.") From this study I concluded that the anthropologist Richard Shweder was probably right in a 1987 critique of Turiel in which he claimed that the moral domain (not just specific rules) varies by culture. Drawing on Shweder's ideas, I would say that the second rule of moral psychology is that morality is not just about how we treat each other (as most liberals think); it is also about binding groups together, supporting essential institutions, and living in a sanctified and noble way.

 . . . . .

On Turiel's definition of morality ("justice, rights, and welfare"), Christian and Hindu communities don't look good. They restrict people's rights (especially sexual rights), encourage hierarchy and conformity to gender roles, and make people spend extraordinary amounts of time in prayer and ritual practices that seem to have nothing to do with "real" morality. But isn't it unfair to impose on all cultures a definition of morality drawn from the European Enlightenment tradition? Might we do better with an approach that defines moral systems by what they do rather than by what they value?

Here's my alternative definition: morality is any system of interlocking values, practices, institutions, and psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible. It turns out that human societies have found several radically different approaches to suppressing selfishness, two of which are most relevant for understanding what Democrats don't understand about morality.

First, imagine society as a social contract invented for our mutual benefit. All individuals are equal, and all should be left as free as possible to move, develop talents, and form relationships as they please. The patron saint of a contractual society is John Stuart Mill, who wrote (in On Liberty) that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." Mill's vision appeals to many liberals and libertarians; a Millian society at its best would be a peaceful, open, and creative place where diverse individuals respect each other's rights and band together voluntarily (as in Obama's calls for "unity") to help those in need or to change the laws for the common good.

Psychologists have done extensive research on the moral mechanisms that are presupposed in a Millian society, and there are two that appear to be partly innate. First, people in all cultures are emotionally responsive to suffering and harm, particularly violent harm, and so nearly all cultures have norms or laws to protect individuals and to encourage care for the most vulnerable. Second, people in all cultures are emotionally responsive to issues of fairness and reciprocity, which often expand into notions of rights and justice. Philosophical efforts to justify liberal democracies and egalitarian social contracts invariably rely heavily on intuitions about fairness and reciprocity.

But now imagine society not as an agreement among individuals but as something that emerged organically over time as people found ways of living together, binding themselves to each other, suppressing each other's selfishness, and punishing the deviants and free-riders who eternally threaten to undermine cooperative groups. The basic social unit is not the individual, it is the hierarchically structured family, which serves as a model for other institutions. Individuals in such societies are born into strong and constraining relationships that profoundly limit their autonomy. The patron saint of this more binding moral system is the sociologist Emile Durkheim, who warned of the dangers of anomie (normlessness), and wrote, in 1897, that "Man cannot become attached to higher aims and submit to a rule if he sees nothing above him to which he belongs. To free himself from all social pressure is to abandon himself and demoralize him." A Durkheimian society at its best would be a stable network composed of many nested and overlapping groups that socialize, reshape, and care for individuals who, if left to their own devices, would pursue shallow, carnal, and selfish pleasures. A Durkheimian society would value self-control over self-expression, duty over rights, and loyalty to one's groups over concerns for outgroups.

A Durkheimian ethos can't be supported by the two moral foundations that hold up a Millian society (harm/care and fairness/reciprocity). My recent research shows that social conservatives do indeed rely upon those two foundations, but they also value virtues related to three additional psychological systems: ingroup/loyalty (involving mechanisms that evolved during the long human history of tribalism), authority/respect (involving ancient primate mechanisms for managing social rank, tempered by the obligation of superiors to protect and provide for subordinates), and purity/sanctity (a relatively new part of the moral mind, related to the evolution of disgust, that makes us see carnality as degrading and renunciation as noble). These three systems support moralities that bind people into intensely interdependent groups that work together to reach common goals. Such moralities make it easier for individuals to forget themselves and coalesce temporarily into hives, a process that is thrilling, as anyone who has ever "lost" him or herself in a choir, protest march, or religious ritual can attest.

 . . . . .

Religion and political leadership are so intertwined across eras and cultures because they are about the same thing: performing the miracle of converting unrelated individuals into a group. Durkheim long ago said that God is really society projected up into the heavens, a collective delusion that enables collectives to exist, suppress selfishness, and endure. The three Durkheimian foundations (ingroup, authority, and purity) play a crucial role in most religions. When they are banished entirely from political life, what remains is a nation of individuals striving to maximize utility while respecting the rules. What remains is a cold but fair social contract, which can easily degenerate into a nation of shoppers.


For full essay which uses these moral distinctions to examine the priorities of liberal and conservative Americans, go to The Edge.  Commentary and related essays are available there as well. 
Source type: Website
Jonathan Haidt
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/haidt08/haidt08_index.html
Viewed on December 2, 2008
Contribution #2735

Source (click to close)

Source type: Website
Jonathan Haidt
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/haidt08/haidt08_index.html
Viewed on December 2, 2008
Contribution #2735


Brain Science and Human Values
Neuro-science researcher Sam Harris responds to an article by psychologist Jonathan Haidt.  Both scientists study morality.   Haidt's article (excerpted here) highlights traditional moral priorities: purity, loyalty, and authority, relating these to the need for social cohesion. Harris argues that that well-being is the ultimate goal of morality and therefore provides a yardstick against which we can measure of other moral instincts and beliefs.  

The human brain is an engine of belief. Our minds continually consume, produce, and attempt to reconcile propositions about ourselves and the world that purport to be true: Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons; human beings are contributing to global climate change; I actually look better with gray hair. What must a brain do to believe such propositions? This question marks the intersection of many fields: psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, economics, political science, and even jurisprudence. Understanding belief at the level of the brain is the main focus of my current research, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).

Belief encompasses two domains that have been traditionally divided in our discourse. We believe propositions about facts, and these acts of cognition subsume almost every effort we make to get at the truth—in science, history, journalism, etc. But we also form beliefs about values: judgments about morality, meaning, personal goals, and life's larger purpose. While they differ in certain respects, these types of belief share some important features.

Both types of belief make tacit claims about normativity: claims not merely about how we human beings think and behave, but about how we should think and behave. Factual beliefs like "water is two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen" and ethical beliefs like "cruelty is wrong" are not expressions of mere preference. To really believe a proposition (whether about facts or values) is also to believe that one has accepted it for legitimate reasons. It is, therefore, to believe that one is in compliance with a variety norms (i.e., that one is sane, rational, not lying to oneself, not overly biased, etc.) When we really believe that something is factually true or morally good, we also believe that another person, similarly placed, should share our conviction.

Despite the remonstrations of people like Jonathan Haidt and Richard Shweder, science has long been in the values business. Scientific validity is not the result of scientists abstaining from making value judgments; it is the result of scientists making their best effort to value principles of reasoning that reliably link their beliefs to reality, through valid chains of evidence and argument. The answer to the question, "What should I believe, and why should I believe it?" is generally a scientific one: Believe a proposition because it is well supported by theory and evidence; believe it because it has been experimentally verified; believe it because a generation of smart people have tried their best to falsify it and failed; believe it because it is true (or seems so). This is a norm of cognition as well as the epistemic core of any scientific mission statement.

But what about meaning and morality? Here we appear to move from questions of truth—which have long been in the domain of science if they are to be found anywhere—to questions of goodness. How should we live? Is it wrong to lie? If so, why and in what sense? Which personal habits, uses of attention, modes of discourse, social institutions, economic systems, governments, etc. are most conducive to human well-being? It is widely imagined that science cannot even pose, much less answer, questions of this sort.

Jonathan Haidt appears to exult in this pessimism. He doubts that anyone can justifiably make strong, realistic claims about right and wrong, or good and evil, because he has observed that human beings tend to make moral judgments on the basis of emotion, justify these judgments with post hoc reasoning, and stick to their guns even when their post hoc reasoning demonstrably fails. As he says in one of his earlier papers, when asked to justify their emotional reactions to certain moral (and pseudo-moral) dilemmas, people are often "morally dumbfounded." He reports that subjects often "stutter, laugh, and express surprise at their inability to find supporting reasons, yet they would not change their initial judgments…" But couldn't the same be said of people's failures to solve logical puzzles? I think it would be fair to say that the Monty Hall problem leaves many of its victims "logically dumbfounded." Which is to say that even when a person gets the gist of why he should switch doors, he often cannot shake his initial intuition that each door represents a 50 percent chance of success. This reliable failure of human reasoning is just that—a failure of reasoning. It does not suggest that there isn't a single correct answer to the Monty Hall problem. While it might seem the height of arrogance to say it, the people who actually understand the Monty Hall problem really do hold the "logical high ground."

As a counterpoint to the prevailing liberal opinion that morality is a system of"prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other," Haidt asks us to ponder mysteries of the following sort: "But if morality is about how we treat each other, then why did so many ancient texts devote so much space to rules about menstruation, who can eat what, and who can have sex with whom?" Interesting question. Are these the same ancient texts that view slavery as morally unproblematic? It would seem so. Perhaps slavery has no moral implications after all—could Abolition have been just another instance of liberal bias?—otherwise, surely these ancient texts would have something of substance to say about it. Or, following Haidt's initial logic, why not ask, "if physics is just a system of laws which explains the structure of the universe in terms of mass and energy, why do so many ancient texts devote so much space to immaterial influences and miraculous acts of God?" Why indeed.

. . . .

Haidt appears to consider it an intellectual virtue to adopt, uncritically, the moral categories of his subjects. But where is it written that everything that people do or decide in the name of "morality" deserves to be considered part its subject matter? A majority of Americans believe that the Bible provides an accurate account of the ancient world (as well as accurate prophecies of the future). Many millions of Americans also believe that a principal cause of cancer is "repressed anger." Happily, we do not allow these opinions to anchor us when it comes time to have serious discussions about history and oncology.

Much of humanity is clearly wrong about morality—just as much of humanity is wrong about physics, biology, history, and everything else worth understanding. If, as I believe, morality is a system of thinking about (and maximizing) the well being of conscious creatures like ourselves, many people's moral concerns are frankly immoral.

Does forcing women and girls to wear burqas make a positive contribution to human well-being? Does it make happier boys and girls? More compassionate men? More confident and contented women? Does it make for better relationships between men and women, between boys and their mothers, or between girls and their fathers? I would bet my life that the answer to each of these questions is "no." So, I think, would many scientists. And yet, most scientists have been trained to think that such judgments are mere expressions of cultural bias. Very few of us seem willing to admit that simple, moral truths increasingly fall within the purview of our scientific worldview. I am confident that this period of reticence will soon come to an end.

Unless human well-being is perfectly random, or equally compatible with any events in the world or state of the brain, there will be scientific truths to be known about it. These truths will, inevitably, force us to draw clear distinctions between ways of thinking and living, judging some to better or worse, more or less true to the facts, and more or less moral.

Of course, questions of human well-being run deeper than any explicit code of morality. Morality—in terms of consciously held precepts, social-contracts, notions of justice, etc.—is a relatively recent invention. Such conventions require, at a minimum, language and a willingness to cooperate with strangers, and this takes us a stride or two beyond the Hobbesian "state of nature." But prior to emergence of explicit notions of right and wrong, the concept of well-being still applies. Whatever behaviors served to mitigate the internecine misery of our ancestors would fall within the scope of this analysis. To simplify matters enormously: (1) genetic changes in the brain gave rise to social emotions, moral intuitions, and language… (2) which produced increasingly complex cooperative behavior, the keeping of promises, concern about one's reputation, etc… (3) which became the basis for cultural norms, laws, and social institutions whose purpose has been to render this growing system of cooperation durable in the face of countervailing forces.

Some version of this progression has occurred in our case, and each step represents an undeniable enhancement of our personal and collective well-being. Of course, catastrophic regressions are always possible. We could, either by design or negligence, employ the hard-won fruits of civilization, and the emotional and social leverage of millennia of biological and cultural evolution, to immiserate ourselves more fully than unaided Nature ever could. Imagine a global North Korea, where the better part of a starving humanity serves as slaves to a lunatic with bouffant hair: this might, in fact, be worse than a world filled merely with warring Australopithecines. What would "worse" mean in this context? Just what our (liberal?) intuitions suggest: more painful, less fulfilling, more conducive to fear and despair, etc. While it will never be feasible to compare such counterfactual states of the world, that does not mean that there are no experiential facts of the matter to be compared.

Haidt is, of course, right to notice that emotions have primacy in many respects—and the way in which feeling drives judgment is surely worthy of study. It does not follow, however, that there are no right and wrong answers to questions of morality. Just as people are often less than rational when claiming to be rational, they are often less than moral when claiming to be moral. We know from many lines of converging research that our feeling of reasoning objectively, in concordance with compelling evidence, is often an illusion. This is especially obvious in split-brain research, when the left hemisphere's "interpreter" finds itself sequestered, and can be enticed to simply confabulate by way of accounting for right-hemisphere behavior. This does not mean, however, that dispassionate reasoning, scrupulous attention to evidence, and awareness of the ever-present possibility of self-deception are not cognitive skills that human beings can acquire. And there is no reason to expect that all cultures and sub-cultures value these skills equally.

If there are objective truths about human well-being—if kindness, for instance, is generally more conducive to happiness than cruelty is—then there seems little doubt that science will one day be able to make strong and precise claims about which of our behaviors and uses of attention are morally good, which are neutral, and which are bad. At time when only 28 percent of Americans will admit the truth of evolution, while 58 percent imagine that a belief in God is necessary for morality, it is truism to say that our culture is not prepared to think critically about the changes to come.

For related essays go to The Edge.

Brain Science and Human Values

The human brain is an engine of belief. Our minds continually consume, produce, and attempt to reconcile propositions about ourselves and the world that purport to be true: Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons; human beings are contributing to global climate change; I actually look better with gray hair. What must a brain do to believe such propositions? This question marks the intersection of many fields: psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, economics, political science, and even jurisprudence. Understanding belief at the level of the brain is the main focus of my current research, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).

Belief encompasses two domains that have been traditionally divided in our discourse. We believe propositions about facts, and these acts of cognition subsume almost every effort we make to get at the truth—in science, history, journalism, etc. But we also form beliefs about values: judgments about morality, meaning, personal goals, and life's larger purpose. While they differ in certain respects, these types of belief share some important features.

Both types of belief make tacit claims about normativity: claims not merely about how we human beings think and behave, but about how we should think and behave. Factual beliefs like "water is two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen" and ethical beliefs like "cruelty is wrong" are not expressions of mere preference. To really believe a proposition (whether about facts or values) is also to believe that one has accepted it for legitimate reasons. It is, therefore, to believe that one is in compliance with a variety norms (i.e., that one is sane, rational, not lying to oneself, not overly biased, etc.) When we really believe that something is factually true or morally good, we also believe that another person, similarly placed, should share our conviction.

Despite the remonstrations of people like Jonathan Haidt and Richard Shweder, science has long been in the values business. Scientific validity is not the result of scientists abstaining from making value judgments; it is the result of scientists making their best effort to value principles of reasoning that reliably link their beliefs to reality, through valid chains of evidence and argument. The answer to the question, "What should I believe, and why should I believe it?" is generally a scientific one: Believe a proposition because it is well supported by theory and evidence; believe it because it has been experimentally verified; believe it because a generation of smart people have tried their best to falsify it and failed; believe it because it is true (or seems so). This is a norm of cognition as well as the epistemic core of any scientific mission statement.

But what about meaning and morality? Here we appear to move from questions of truth—which have long been in the domain of science if they are to be found anywhere—to questions of goodness. How should we live? Is it wrong to lie? If so, why and in what sense? Which personal habits, uses of attention, modes of discourse, social institutions, economic systems, governments, etc. are most conducive to human well-being? It is widely imagined that science cannot even pose, much less answer, questions of this sort.

Jonathan Haidt appears to exult in this pessimism. He doubts that anyone can justifiably make strong, realistic claims about right and wrong, or good and evil, because he has observed that human beings tend to make moral judgments on the basis of emotion, justify these judgments with post hoc reasoning, and stick to their guns even when their post hoc reasoning demonstrably fails. As he says in one of his earlier papers, when asked to justify their emotional reactions to certain moral (and pseudo-moral) dilemmas, people are often "morally dumbfounded." He reports that subjects often "stutter, laugh, and express surprise at their inability to find supporting reasons, yet they would not change their initial judgments…" But couldn't the same be said of people's failures to solve logical puzzles? I think it would be fair to say that the Monty Hall problem leaves many of its victims "logically dumbfounded." Which is to say that even when a person gets the gist of why he should switch doors, he often cannot shake his initial intuition that each door represents a 50 percent chance of success. This reliable failure of human reasoning is just that—a failure of reasoning. It does not suggest that there isn't a single correct answer to the Monty Hall problem. While it might seem the height of arrogance to say it, the people who actually understand the Monty Hall problem really do hold the "logical high ground."

As a counterpoint to the prevailing liberal opinion that morality is a system of"prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other," Haidt asks us to ponder mysteries of the following sort: "But if morality is about how we treat each other, then why did so many ancient texts devote so much space to rules about menstruation, who can eat what, and who can have sex with whom?" Interesting question. Are these the same ancient texts that view slavery as morally unproblematic? It would seem so. Perhaps slavery has no moral implications after all—could Abolition have been just another instance of liberal bias?—otherwise, surely these ancient texts would have something of substance to say about it. Or, following Haidt's initial logic, why not ask, "if physics is just a system of laws which explains the structure of the universe in terms of mass and energy, why do so many ancient texts devote so much space to immaterial influences and miraculous acts of God?" Why indeed.

. . . .

Haidt appears to consider it an intellectual virtue to adopt, uncritically, the moral categories of his subjects. But where is it written that everything that people do or decide in the name of "morality" deserves to be considered part its subject matter? A majority of Americans believe that the Bible provides an accurate account of the ancient world (as well as accurate prophecies of the future). Many millions of Americans also believe that a principal cause of cancer is "repressed anger." Happily, we do not allow these opinions to anchor us when it comes time to have serious discussions about history and oncology.

Much of humanity is clearly wrong about morality—just as much of humanity is wrong about physics, biology, history, and everything else worth understanding. If, as I believe, morality is a system of thinking about (and maximizing) the well being of conscious creatures like ourselves, many people's moral concerns are frankly immoral.

Does forcing women and girls to wear burqas make a positive contribution to human well-being? Does it make happier boys and girls? More compassionate men? More confident and contented women? Does it make for better relationships between men and women, between boys and their mothers, or between girls and their fathers? I would bet my life that the answer to each of these questions is "no." So, I think, would many scientists. And yet, most scientists have been trained to think that such judgments are mere expressions of cultural bias. Very few of us seem willing to admit that simple, moral truths increasingly fall within the purview of our scientific worldview. I am confident that this period of reticence will soon come to an end.

Unless human well-being is perfectly random, or equally compatible with any events in the world or state of the brain, there will be scientific truths to be known about it. These truths will, inevitably, force us to draw clear distinctions between ways of thinking and living, judging some to better or worse, more or less true to the facts, and more or less moral.

Of course, questions of human well-being run deeper than any explicit code of morality. Morality—in terms of consciously held precepts, social-contracts, notions of justice, etc.—is a relatively recent invention. Such conventions require, at a minimum, language and a willingness to cooperate with strangers, and this takes us a stride or two beyond the Hobbesian "state of nature." But prior to emergence of explicit notions of right and wrong, the concept of well-being still applies. Whatever behaviors served to mitigate the internecine misery of our ancestors would fall within the scope of this analysis. To simplify matters enormously: (1) genetic changes in the brain gave rise to social emotions, moral intuitions, and language… (2) which produced increasingly complex cooperative behavior, the keeping of promises, concern about one's reputation, etc… (3) which became the basis for cultural norms, laws, and social institutions whose purpose has been to render this growing system of cooperation durable in the face of countervailing forces.

Some version of this progression has occurred in our case, and each step represents an undeniable enhancement of our personal and collective well-being. Of course, catastrophic regressions are always possible. We could, either by design or negligence, employ the hard-won fruits of civilization, and the emotional and social leverage of millennia of biological and cultural evolution, to immiserate ourselves more fully than unaided Nature ever could. Imagine a global North Korea, where the better part of a starving humanity serves as slaves to a lunatic with bouffant hair: this might, in fact, be worse than a world filled merely with warring Australopithecines. What would "worse" mean in this context? Just what our (liberal?) intuitions suggest: more painful, less fulfilling, more conducive to fear and despair, etc. While it will never be feasible to compare such counterfactual states of the world, that does not mean that there are no experiential facts of the matter to be compared.

Haidt is, of course, right to notice that emotions have primacy in many respects—and the way in which feeling drives judgment is surely worthy of study. It does not follow, however, that there are no right and wrong answers to questions of morality. Just as people are often less than rational when claiming to be rational, they are often less than moral when claiming to be moral. We know from many lines of converging research that our feeling of reasoning objectively, in concordance with compelling evidence, is often an illusion. This is especially obvious in split-brain research, when the left hemisphere's "interpreter" finds itself sequestered, and can be enticed to simply confabulate by way of accounting for right-hemisphere behavior. This does not mean, however, that dispassionate reasoning, scrupulous attention to evidence, and awareness of the ever-present possibility of self-deception are not cognitive skills that human beings can acquire. And there is no reason to expect that all cultures and sub-cultures value these skills equally.

If there are objective truths about human well-being—if kindness, for instance, is generally more conducive to happiness than cruelty is—then there seems little doubt that science will one day be able to make strong and precise claims about which of our behaviors and uses of attention are morally good, which are neutral, and which are bad. At time when only 28 percent of Americans will admit the truth of evolution, while 58 percent imagine that a belief in God is necessary for morality, it is truism to say that our culture is not prepared to think critically about the changes to come.

For related essays go to The Edge.

Source type: Website
The Edge
Sam Harris
http://www.edge.org/discourse/vote_morality.html#harriss
Viewed on December 2, 2008
Contribution #2733

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Source type: Website
The Edge
Sam Harris
http://www.edge.org/discourse/vote_morality.html#harriss
Viewed on December 2, 2008
Contribution #2733


The Moral Instinct
 . . . The idea that the moral sense is an innate part of human nature is not far-fetched. A list of human universals collected by the anthropologist Donald E. Brown includes many moral concepts and emotions, including a distinction between right and wrong; empathy; fairness; admiration of generosity; rights and obligations; . . . . Far from debunking morality, then, the science of the moral sense can advance it, by allowing us . . .  to focus on goals we can share and defend.
Which of the following people would you say is the most admirable: Mother Teresa, Bill Gates or Norman Borlaug? And which do you think is the least admirable? For most people, it's an easy question. Mother Teresa, famous for ministering to the poor in Calcutta, has been beatified by the Vatican, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and ranked in an American poll as the most admired person of the 20th century. Bill Gates, infamous for giving us the Microsoft dancing paper clip and the blue screen of death, has been decapitated in effigy in "I Hate Gates" Web sites and hit with a pie in the face. As for Norman Borlaug . . . who the heck is Norman Borlaug?

Yet a deeper look might lead you to rethink your answers. Borlaug, father of the "Green Revolution" that used agricultural science to reduce world hunger, has been credited with saving a billion lives, more than anyone else in history. Gates, in deciding what to do with his fortune, crunched the numbers and determined that he could alleviate the most misery by fighting everyday scourges in the developing world like malaria, diarrhea and parasites. Mother Teresa, for her part, extolled the virtue of suffering and ran her well-financed missions accordingly: their sick patrons were offered plenty of prayer but harsh conditions, few analgesics and dangerously primitive medical care.

It's not hard to see why the moral reputations of this trio should be so out of line with the good they have done. Mother Teresa was the very embodiment of saintliness: white-clad, sad-eyed, ascetic and often photographed with the wretched of the earth. Gates is a nerd's nerd and the world's richest man, as likely to enter heaven as the proverbial camel squeezing through the needle's eye. And Borlaug, now 93, is an agronomist who has spent his life in labs and nonprofits, seldom walking onto the media stage, and hence into our consciousness, at all.

I doubt these examples will persuade anyone to favor Bill Gates over Mother Teresa for sainthood. But they show that our heads can be turned by an aura of sanctity, distracting us from a more objective reckoning of the actions that make people suffer or flourish. It seems we may all be vulnerable to moral illusions the ethical equivalent of the bending lines that trick the eye on cereal boxes and in psychology textbooks. Illusions are a favorite tool of perception scientists for exposing the workings of the five senses, and of philosophers for shaking people out of the naive belief that our minds give us a transparent window onto the world (since if our eyes can be fooled by an illusion, why should we trust them at other times?). Today, a new field is using illusions to unmask a sixth sense, the moral sense. Moral intuitions are being drawn out of people in the lab, on Web sites and in brain scanners, and are being explained with tools from game theory, neuroscience and evolutionary biology.

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them," wrote Immanuel Kant, "the starry heavens above and the moral law within." These days, the moral law within is being viewed with increasing awe, if not always admiration. The human moral sense turns out to be an organ of considerable complexity, with quirks that reflect its evolutionary history and its neurobiological foundations.

These quirks are bound to have implications for the human predicament. Morality is not just any old topic in psychology but close to our conception of the meaning of life. Moral goodness is what gives each of us the sense that we are worthy human beings. We seek it in our friends and mates, nurture it in our children, advance it in our politics and justify it with our religions. A disrespect for morality is blamed for everyday sins and history's worst atrocities. To carry this weight, the concept of morality would have to be bigger than any of us and outside all of us.

So dissecting moral intuitions is no small matter. If morality is a mere trick of the brain, some may fear, our very grounds for being moral could be eroded. Yet as we shall see, the science of the moral sense can instead be seen as a way to strengthen those grounds, by clarifying what morality is and how it should steer our actions.

The Moralization Switch

The starting point for appreciating that there is a distinctive part of our psychology for morality is seeing how moral judgments differ from other kinds of opinions we have on how people ought to behave. Moralization is a psychological state that can be turned on and off like a switch, and when it is on, a distinctive mind-set commandeers our thinking. This is the mind-set that makes us deem actions immoral (“killing is wrong”), rather than merely disagreeable (“I hate brussels sprouts”), unfashionable (“bell-bottoms are out”) or imprudent (“don’t scratch mosquito bites”).
 

The first hallmark of moralization is that the rules it invokes are felt to be universal. Prohibitions of rape and murder, for example, are felt not to be matters of local custom but to be universally and objectively warranted. One can easily say, “I don’t like brussels sprouts, but I don’t care if you eat them,” but no one would say, “I don’t like killing, but I don’t care if you murder someone.”

The other hallmark is that people feel that those who commit immoral acts deserve to be punished. Not only is it allowable to inflict pain on a person who has broken a moral rule; it is wrong not to, to “let them get away with it.” People are thus untroubled in inviting divine retribution or the power of the state to harm other people they deem immoral. Bertrand Russell wrote, “The infliction of cruelty with a good conscience is a delight to moralists — that is why they invented hell.”


We all know what it feels like when the moralization switch flips inside us — the righteous glow, the burning dudgeon, the drive to recruit others to the cause. The psychologist Paul Rozin has studied the toggle switch by comparing two kinds of people who engage in the same behavior but with different switch settings. Health vegetarians avoid meat for practical reasons, like lowering cholesterol and avoiding toxins. Moral vegetarians avoid meat for ethical reasons: to avoid complicity in the suffering of animals. By investigating their feelings about meat-eating, Rozin showed that the moral motive sets off a cascade of opinions. Moral vegetarians are more likely to treat meat as a contaminant — they refuse, for example, to eat a bowl of soup into which a drop of beef broth has fallen. They are more likely to think that other people ought to be vegetarians, and are more likely to imbue their dietary habits with other virtues, like believing that meat avoidance makes people less aggressive and bestial.


Much of our recent social history, including the culture wars between liberals and conservatives, consists of the moralization or amoralization of particular kinds of behavior. Even when people agree that an outcome is desirable, they may disagree on whether it should be treated as a matter of preference and prudence or as a matter of sin and virtue. Rozin notes, for example, that smoking has lately been moralized. Until recently, it was understood that some people didn’t enjoy smoking or avoided it because it was hazardous to their health. But with the discovery of the harmful effects of secondhand smoke, smoking is now treated as immoral. Smokers are ostracized; images of people smoking are censored; and entities touched by smoke are felt to be contaminated (so hotels have not only nonsmoking rooms but nonsmoking floors). The desire for retribution has been visited on tobacco companies, who have been slapped with staggering “punitive damages.”


At the same time, many behaviors have been amoralized, switched from moral failings to lifestyle choices. They include divorce, illegitimacy, being a working mother, marijuana use and homosexuality. Many afflictions have been reassigned from payback for bad choices to unlucky misfortunes. There used to be people called “bums” and “tramps”; today they are “homeless.” Drug addiction is a “disease”; syphilis was rebranded from the price of wanton behavior to a “sexually transmitted disease” and more recently a “sexually transmitted infection.”


This wave of amoralization has led the cultural right to lament that morality itself is under assault, as we see in the group that anointed itself the Moral Majority. In fact there seems to be a Law of Conservation of Moralization, so that as old behaviors are taken out of the moralized column, new ones are added to it. Dozens of things that past generations treated as practical matters are now ethical battlegrounds, including disposable diapers, I.Q. tests, poultry farms, Barbie dolls and research on breast cancer. Food alone has become a minefield, with critics sermonizing about the size of sodas, the chemistry of fat, the freedom of chickens, the price of coffee beans, the species of fish and now the distance the food has traveled from farm to plate.


Many of these moralizations, like the assault on smoking, may be understood as practical tactics to reduce some recently identified harm. But whether an activity flips our mental switches to the “moral” setting isn’t just a matter of how much harm it does. We don’t show contempt to the man who fails to change the batteries in his smoke alarms or takes his family on a driving vacation, both of which multiply the risk they will die in an accident. Driving a gas-guzzling Hummer is reprehensible, but driving a gas-guzzling old Volvo is not; eating a Big Mac is unconscionable, but not imported cheese or crème brûlée. The reason for these double standards is obvious: people tend to align their moralization with their own lifestyles.


Reasoning and Rationalizing


It’s not just the content of our moral judgments that is often questionable, but the way we arrive at them. We like to think that when we have a conviction, there are good reasons that drove us to adopt it. That is why an older approach to moral psychology, led by Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, tried to document the lines of reasoning that guided people to moral conclusions. But consider these situations, originally devised by the psychologist Jonathan Haidt:


Julie is traveling in France on summer vacation from college with her brother Mark. One night they decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. Julie was already taking birth-control pills, but Mark uses a condom, too, just to be safe. They both enjoy the sex but decide not to do it again. They keep the night as a special secret, which makes them feel closer to each other. What do you think about that — was it O.K. for them to make love?


A woman is cleaning out her closet and she finds her old American flag. She doesn’t want the flag anymore, so she cuts it up into pieces and uses the rags to clean her bathroom.


A family’s dog is killed by a car in front of their house. They heard that dog meat was delicious, so they cut up the dog’s body and cook it and eat it for dinner.


Most people immediately declare that these acts are wrong and then grope to justify why they are wrong. It’s not so easy. In the case of Julie and Mark, people raise the possibility of children with birth defects, but they are reminded that the couple were diligent about contraception. They suggest that the siblings will be emotionally hurt, but the story makes it clear that they weren’t. They submit that the act would offend the community, but then recall that it was kept a secret. Eventually many people admit, “I don’t know, I can’t explain it, I just know it’s wrong.” People don’t generally engage in moral reasoning, Haidt argues, but moral rationalization: they begin with the conclusion, coughed up by an unconscious emotion, and then work backward to a plausible justification.


The gap between people’s convictions and their justifications is also on display in the favorite new sandbox for moral psychologists, a thought experiment devised by the philosophers Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis Thomson called the Trolley Problem. On your morning walk, you see a trolley car hurtling down the track, the conductor slumped over the controls. In the path of the trolley are five men working on the track, oblivious to the danger. You are standing at a fork in the track and can pull a lever that will divert the trolley onto a spur, saving the five men. Unfortunately, the trolley would then run over a single worker who is laboring on the spur. Is it permissible to throw the switch, killing one man to save five? Almost everyone says “yes.”


Consider now a different scene. You are on a bridge overlooking the tracks and have spotted the runaway trolley bearing down on the five workers. Now the only way to stop the trolley is to throw a heavy object in its path. And the only heavy object within reach is a fat man standing next to you. Should you throw the man off the bridge? Both dilemmas present you with the option of sacrificing one life to save five, and so, by the utilitarian standard of what would result in the greatest good for the greatest number, the two dilemmas are morally equivalent. But most people don’t see it that way: though they would pull the switch in the first dilemma, they would not heave the fat man in the second. When pressed for a reason, they can’t come up with anything coherent, though moral philosophers haven’t had an easy time coming up with a relevant difference, either.

To continue this article or see related comments and letters go to:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html?ref=science

The Moral Instinct

Which of the following people would you say is the most admirable: Mother Teresa, Bill Gates or Norman Borlaug? And which do you think is the least admirable? For most people, it's an easy question. Mother Teresa, famous for ministering to the poor in Calcutta, has been beatified by the Vatican, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and ranked in an American poll as the most admired person of the 20th century. Bill Gates, infamous for giving us the Microsoft dancing paper clip and the blue screen of death, has been decapitated in effigy in "I Hate Gates" Web sites and hit with a pie in the face. As for Norman Borlaug . . . who the heck is Norman Borlaug?

Yet a deeper look might lead you to rethink your answers. Borlaug, father of the "Green Revolution" that used agricultural science to reduce world hunger, has been credited with saving a billion lives, more than anyone else in history. Gates, in deciding what to do with his fortune, crunched the numbers and determined that he could alleviate the most misery by fighting everyday scourges in the developing world like malaria, diarrhea and parasites. Mother Teresa, for her part, extolled the virtue of suffering and ran her well-financed missions accordingly: their sick patrons were offered plenty of prayer but harsh conditions, few analgesics and dangerously primitive medical care.

It's not hard to see why the moral reputations of this trio should be so out of line with the good they have done. Mother Teresa was the very embodiment of saintliness: white-clad, sad-eyed, ascetic and often photographed with the wretched of the earth. Gates is a nerd's nerd and the world's richest man, as likely to enter heaven as the proverbial camel squeezing through the needle's eye. And Borlaug, now 93, is an agronomist who has spent his life in labs and nonprofits, seldom walking onto the media stage, and hence into our consciousness, at all.

I doubt these examples will persuade anyone to favor Bill Gates over Mother Teresa for sainthood. But they show that our heads can be turned by an aura of sanctity, distracting us from a more objective reckoning of the actions that make people suffer or flourish. It seems we may all be vulnerable to moral illusions the ethical equivalent of the bending lines that trick the eye on cereal boxes and in psychology textbooks. Illusions are a favorite tool of perception scientists for exposing the workings of the five senses, and of philosophers for shaking people out of the naive belief that our minds give us a transparent window onto the world (since if our eyes can be fooled by an illusion, why should we trust them at other times?). Today, a new field is using illusions to unmask a sixth sense, the moral sense. Moral intuitions are being drawn out of people in the lab, on Web sites and in brain scanners, and are being explained with tools from game theory, neuroscience and evolutionary biology.

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them," wrote Immanuel Kant, "the starry heavens above and the moral law within." These days, the moral law within is being viewed with increasing awe, if not always admiration. The human moral sense turns out to be an organ of considerable complexity, with quirks that reflect its evolutionary history and its neurobiological foundations.

These quirks are bound to have implications for the human predicament. Morality is not just any old topic in psychology but close to our conception of the meaning of life. Moral goodness is what gives each of us the sense that we are worthy human beings. We seek it in our friends and mates, nurture it in our children, advance it in our politics and justify it with our religions. A disrespect for morality is blamed for everyday sins and history's worst atrocities. To carry this weight, the concept of morality would have to be bigger than any of us and outside all of us.

So dissecting moral intuitions is no small matter. If morality is a mere trick of the brain, some may fear, our very grounds for being moral could be eroded. Yet as we shall see, the science of the moral sense can instead be seen as a way to strengthen those grounds, by clarifying what morality is and how it should steer our actions.

The Moralization Switch

The starting point for appreciating that there is a distinctive part of our psychology for morality is seeing how moral judgments differ from other kinds of opinions we have on how people ought to behave. Moralization is a psychological state that can be turned on and off like a switch, and when it is on, a distinctive mind-set commandeers our thinking. This is the mind-set that makes us deem actions immoral (“killing is wrong”), rather than merely disagreeable (“I hate brussels sprouts”), unfashionable (“bell-bottoms are out”) or imprudent (“don’t scratch mosquito bites”).
 

The first hallmark of moralization is that the rules it invokes are felt to be universal. Prohibitions of rape and murder, for example, are felt not to be matters of local custom but to be universally and objectively warranted. One can easily say, “I don’t like brussels sprouts, but I don’t care if you eat them,” but no one would say, “I don’t like killing, but I don’t care if you murder someone.”

The other hallmark is that people feel that those who commit immoral acts deserve to be punished. Not only is it allowable to inflict pain on a person who has broken a moral rule; it is wrong not to, to “let them get away with it.” People are thus untroubled in inviting divine retribution or the power of the state to harm other people they deem immoral. Bertrand Russell wrote, “The infliction of cruelty with a good conscience is a delight to moralists — that is why they invented hell.”


We all know what it feels like when the moralization switch flips inside us — the righteous glow, the burning dudgeon, the drive to recruit others to the cause. The psychologist Paul Rozin has studied the toggle switch by comparing two kinds of people who engage in the same behavior but with different switch settings. Health vegetarians avoid meat for practical reasons, like lowering cholesterol and avoiding toxins. Moral vegetarians avoid meat for ethical reasons: to avoid complicity in the suffering of animals. By investigating their feelings about meat-eating, Rozin showed that the moral motive sets off a cascade of opinions. Moral vegetarians are more likely to treat meat as a contaminant — they refuse, for example, to eat a bowl of soup into which a drop of beef broth has fallen. They are more likely to think that other people ought to be vegetarians, and are more likely to imbue their dietary habits with other virtues, like believing that meat avoidance makes people less aggressive and bestial.


Much of our recent social history, including the culture wars between liberals and conservatives, consists of the moralization or amoralization of particular kinds of behavior. Even when people agree that an outcome is desirable, they may disagree on whether it should be treated as a matter of preference and prudence or as a matter of sin and virtue. Rozin notes, for example, that smoking has lately been moralized. Until recently, it was understood that some people didn’t enjoy smoking or avoided it because it was hazardous to their health. But with the discovery of the harmful effects of secondhand smoke, smoking is now treated as immoral. Smokers are ostracized; images of people smoking are censored; and entities touched by smoke are felt to be contaminated (so hotels have not only nonsmoking rooms but nonsmoking floors). The desire for retribution has been visited on tobacco companies, who have been slapped with staggering “punitive damages.”


At the same time, many behaviors have been amoralized, switched from moral failings to lifestyle choices. They include divorce, illegitimacy, being a working mother, marijuana use and homosexuality. Many afflictions have been reassigned from payback for bad choices to unlucky misfortunes. There used to be people called “bums” and “tramps”; today they are “homeless.” Drug addiction is a “disease”; syphilis was rebranded from the price of wanton behavior to a “sexually transmitted disease” and more recently a “sexually transmitted infection.”


This wave of amoralization has led the cultural right to lament that morality itself is under assault, as we see in the group that anointed itself the Moral Majority. In fact there seems to be a Law of Conservation of Moralization, so that as old behaviors are taken out of the moralized column, new ones are added to it. Dozens of things that past generations treated as practical matters are now ethical battlegrounds, including disposable diapers, I.Q. tests, poultry farms, Barbie dolls and research on breast cancer. Food alone has become a minefield, with critics sermonizing about the size of sodas, the chemistry of fat, the freedom of chickens, the price of coffee beans, the species of fish and now the distance the food has traveled from farm to plate.


Many of these moralizations, like the assault on smoking, may be understood as practical tactics to reduce some recently identified harm. But whether an activity flips our mental switches to the “moral” setting isn’t just a matter of how much harm it does. We don’t show contempt to the man who fails to change the batteries in his smoke alarms or takes his family on a driving vacation, both of which multiply the risk they will die in an accident. Driving a gas-guzzling Hummer is reprehensible, but driving a gas-guzzling old Volvo is not; eating a Big Mac is unconscionable, but not imported cheese or crème brûlée. The reason for these double standards is obvious: people tend to align their moralization with their own lifestyles.


Reasoning and Rationalizing


It’s not just the content of our moral judgments that is often questionable, but the way we arrive at them. We like to think that when we have a conviction, there are good reasons that drove us to adopt it. That is why an older approach to moral psychology, led by Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, tried to document the lines of reasoning that guided people to moral conclusions. But consider these situations, originally devised by the psychologist Jonathan Haidt:


Julie is traveling in France on summer vacation from college with her brother Mark. One night they decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. Julie was already taking birth-control pills, but Mark uses a condom, too, just to be safe. They both enjoy the sex but decide not to do it again. They keep the night as a special secret, which makes them feel closer to each other. What do you think about that — was it O.K. for them to make love?


A woman is cleaning out her closet and she finds her old American flag. She doesn’t want the flag anymore, so she cuts it up into pieces and uses the rags to clean her bathroom.


A family’s dog is killed by a car in front of their house. They heard that dog meat was delicious, so they cut up the dog’s body and cook it and eat it for dinner.


Most people immediately declare that these acts are wrong and then grope to justify why they are wrong. It’s not so easy. In the case of Julie and Mark, people raise the possibility of children with birth defects, but they are reminded that the couple were diligent about contraception. They suggest that the siblings will be emotionally hurt, but the story makes it clear that they weren’t. They submit that the act would offend the community, but then recall that it was kept a secret. Eventually many people admit, “I don’t know, I can’t explain it, I just know it’s wrong.” People don’t generally engage in moral reasoning, Haidt argues, but moral rationalization: they begin with the conclusion, coughed up by an unconscious emotion, and then work backward to a plausible justification.


The gap between people’s convictions and their justifications is also on display in the favorite new sandbox for moral psychologists, a thought experiment devised by the philosophers Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis Thomson called the Trolley Problem. On your morning walk, you see a trolley car hurtling down the track, the conductor slumped over the controls. In the path of the trolley are five men working on the track, oblivious to the danger. You are standing at a fork in the track and can pull a lever that will divert the trolley onto a spur, saving the five men. Unfortunately, the trolley would then run over a single worker who is laboring on the spur. Is it permissible to throw the switch, killing one man to save five? Almost everyone says “yes.”


Consider now a different scene. You are on a bridge overlooking the tracks and have spotted the runaway trolley bearing down on the five workers. Now the only way to stop the trolley is to throw a heavy object in its path. And the only heavy object within reach is a fat man standing next to you. Should you throw the man off the bridge? Both dilemmas present you with the option of sacrificing one life to save five, and so, by the utilitarian standard of what would result in the greatest good for the greatest number, the two dilemmas are morally equivalent. But most people don’t see it that way: though they would pull the switch in the first dilemma, they would not heave the fat man in the second. When pressed for a reason, they can’t come up with anything coherent, though moral philosophers haven’t had an easy time coming up with a relevant difference, either.

To continue this article or see related comments and letters go to:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html?ref=science

Source type: Periodical
New York Times Magazine The Moral Instinct http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html?ref=science
Contribution #2725

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Source type: Periodical
New York Times Magazine The Moral Instinct http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html?ref=science
Contribution #2725


Is "Do Unto Others" Written Into Our Genes?
A NYT article looks at research by moral psychologist, Dr. Jonathan Haidt.

Where do moral rules come from? From reason, some philosophers say. From God, say believers. Seldom considered is a source now being advocated by some biologists, that of evolution.

At first glance, natural selection and the survival of the fittest may seem to reward only the most selfish values. But for animals that live in groups, selfishness must be strictly curbed or there will be no advantage to social living. Could the behaviors evolved by social animals to make societies work be the foundation from which human morality evolved?

In a series of recent articles and a book, The Happiness Hypothesis, Jonathan Haidt, a moral psychologist at the University of Virginia, has been constructing a broad evolutionary view of morality that traces its connections both to religion and to politics.

Dr. Haidt (pronounced height) began his research career by probing the emotion of disgust. Testing people's reactions to situations like that of a hungry family that cooked and ate its pet dog after it had become roadkill, he explored the phenomenon of moral dumbfounding (when people feel strongly that something is wrong but cannot explain why.)

Dumbfounding led him to view morality as driven by two separate mental systems, one ancient and one modern, though the mind is scarcely aware of the difference. The ancient system, which he calls moral intuition, is based on the emotion-laden moral behaviors that evolved before the development of language. The modern system --he calls it moral judgment -- came after language, when people became able to articulate why something was right or wrong.

The emotional responses of moral intuition occur instantaneously --they are primitive gut reactions that evolved to generate split-second decisions and enhance survival in a dangerous world. Moral judgment, on the other hand, comes later, as the conscious mind develops a plausible rationalization for the decision already arrived at through moral intuition.

Moral dumbfounding, in Dr. Haidt's view, occurs when moral judgment fails to come up with a convincing explanation for what moral intuition has decided.

So why has evolution equipped the brain with two moral systems when just one might seem plenty?

"We have a complex animal mind that only recently evolved language and language-based reasoning," Dr. Haidt said. "No way was control of the organism going to be handed over to this novel faculty."

He likens the mind¹s subterranean moral machinery to an elephant, and conscious moral reasoning to a small rider on the elephant's back. Psychologists and philosophers have long taken a far too narrow view of morality, he believes, because they have focused on the rider and largely ignored the elephant.

Dr. Haidt developed a better sense of the elephant after visiting India at the suggestion of an anthropologist, Richard Shweder. In Bhubaneswar, in the Indian state of Orissa, Dr. Haidt saw that people recognized a much wider moral domain than the issues of harm and justice that are central to Western morality. Indians were concerned with integrating the community through rituals and committed to concepts of religious purity as a way to restrain behavior.

On his return from India, Dr. Haidt combed the literature of anthropology and psychology for ideas about morality throughout the world. He identified five components of morality that were common to most cultures. Some concerned the protection of individuals, others the ties that bind a group together.

Of the moral systems that protect individuals, one is concerned with preventing harm to the person and the other with reciprocity and fairness. Less familiar are the three systems that promote behaviors developed for strengthening the group. These are loyalty to the in-group, respect for authority and hierarchy, and a sense of purity or sanctity.

The five moral systems, in Dr. Haidt's view, are innate psychological mechanisms that predispose children to absorb certain virtues. Because these virtues are learned, morality may vary widely from culture to culture, while maintaining its central role of restraining selfishness. In Western societies, the focus is on protecting individuals by insisting that everyone be treated fairly. Creativity is high, but society is less orderly. In many other societies, selfishness is suppressed "through practices, rituals and stories that help a person play a cooperative role in a larger social entity,"Dr. Haidt said.

He is aware that many people --including "the politically homogeneous discipline of psychology" -- equate morality with justice, rights and the welfare of the individual, and dismiss everything else as mere social convention. But many societies around the world do in fact behave as if loyalty, respect for authority and sanctity are moral concepts, Dr. Haidt notes, and this justifies taking a wider view of the moral domain.

The idea that morality and sacredness are intertwined, he said, may now be out of fashion but has a venerable pedigree, tracing back to Emile Durkheim, a founder of sociology.

Dr. Haidt believes that religion has played an important role in human evolution by strengthening and extending the cohesion provided by the moral systems. "If we didn't have religious minds we would not have stepped through the transition to groupishness," he said. "We'd still be just small bands roving around."

Religious behavior may be the result of natural selection, in his view, shaped at a time when early human groups were competing with one another. "Those who found ways to bind themselves together were more successful,"he said.

Dr. Haidt came to recognize the importance of religion by a roundabout route. "I first found divinity in disgust," he writes in his book The Happiness Hypothesis.

The emotion of disgust probably evolved when people became meat eaters and had to learn which foods might be contaminated with bacteria, a problem not presented by plant foods. Disgust was then extended to many other categories, he argues, to people who were unclean, to unacceptable sexual practices and to a wide class of bodily functions and behaviors that were seen as separating humans from animals.

"Imagine visiting a town," Dr. Haidt writes, "where people wear no clothes, never bathe, have sex 'doggie style' in public, and eat raw meat by biting off pieces directly from the carcass."

He sees the disgust evoked by such a scene as allied to notions of physical and religious purity. Purity is, in his view, a moral system that promotes the goals of controlling selfish desires and acting in a religiously approved way.

Notions of disgust and purity are widespread outside Western cultures. "Educated liberals are the only group to say, 'I find that disgusting but that doesn't make it wrong,'" Dr. Haidt said.

Working with a graduate student, Jesse Graham, Dr. Haidt has detected a striking political dimension to morality. He and Mr. Graham asked people to identify their position on a liberal-conservative spectrum and then complete a questionnaire that assessed the importance attached to each of the five moral systems. (The test, called the moral foundations questionnaire, can be taken online, at www.YourMorals.org.)

They found that people who identified themselves as liberals attached great weight to the two moral systems protective of individuals --those of not harming others and of doing as you would be done by. But liberals assigned much less importance to the three moral systems that protect the group, those of loyalty, respect for authority and purity.

Conservatives placed value on all five moral systems but they assigned less weight than liberals to the moralities protective of individuals.

Dr. Haidt believes that many political disagreements between liberals and conservatives may reflect the different emphasis each places on the five moral categories.

Take attitudes to contemporary art and music. Conservatives fear that subversive art will undermine authority, violate the in-group's traditions and offend canons of purity and sanctity. Liberals, on the other hand, see contemporary art as protecting equality by assailing the establishment, especially if the art is by oppressed groups.

Extreme liberals, Dr. Haidt argues, attach almost no importance to the moral systems that protect the group. Because conservatives do give some weight to individual protections, they often have a better understanding of liberal views than liberals do of conservative attitudes, in his view.

Dr. Haidt, who describes himself as a moderate liberal, says that societies need people with both types of personality. "A liberal morality will encourage much greater creativity but will weaken social structure and deplete social capital," he said. "I am really glad we have New York and San Francisco --most of our creativity comes out of cities like these. But a nation that was just New York and San Francisco could not survive very long. Conservatives give more to charity and tend to be more supportive of essential institutions like the military and law enforcement."

Other psychologists have mixed views about Dr. Haidt's ideas.

Steven Pinker, a cognitive scientist at Harvard, said, "I'm a big fan of Haidt's work." He added that the idea of including purity in the moral domain could make psychological sense even if purity had no place in moral reasoning.

But Frans B. M. de Waal, a primatologist at Emory University, said he disagreed with Dr. Haidt's view that the task of morality is to suppress selfishness. Many animals show empathy and altruistic tendencies but do not have moral systems.

"For me, the moral system is one that resolves the tension between individual and group interests in a way that seems best for the most members of the group, hence promotes a give and take,"Dr. de Waal said.

He said that he also disagreed with Dr. Haidt¹s alignment of liberals with individual rights and conservatives with social cohesiveness.

"It is obvious that liberals emphasize the common good --safety laws for coal mines, health care for all, support for the poor -- that are not nearly as well recognized by conservatives," Dr. de Waal said.

That alignment also bothers John T. Jost, a political psychologist at New York University. Dr. Jost said he admired Dr. Haidt as a "very interesting and creative social psychologist" and found his work useful in drawing attention to the strong moral element in political beliefs.

But the fact that liberals and conservatives agree on the first two of Dr. Haidt's principles --do no harm and do unto others as you would have them do unto you ‹ means that those are good candidates to be moral virtues. The fact that liberals and conservatives disagree on the other three principles "suggests to me that they are not general moral virtues but specific ideological commitments or values," Dr. Jost said.

In defense of his views, Dr. Haidt said that moral claims could be valid even if not universally acknowledged.

"It is at least possible," he said, "that conservatives and traditional societies have some moral or sociological insights that secular liberals do not understand."

Is "Do Unto Others" Written Into Our Genes?

Where do moral rules come from? From reason, some philosophers say. From God, say believers. Seldom considered is a source now being advocated by some biologists, that of evolution.

At first glance, natural selection and the survival of the fittest may seem to reward only the most selfish values. But for animals that live in groups, selfishness must be strictly curbed or there will be no advantage to social living. Could the behaviors evolved by social animals to make societies work be the foundation from which human morality evolved?

In a series of recent articles and a book, The Happiness Hypothesis, Jonathan Haidt, a moral psychologist at the University of Virginia, has been constructing a broad evolutionary view of morality that traces its connections both to religion and to politics.

Dr. Haidt (pronounced height) began his research career by probing the emotion of disgust. Testing people's reactions to situations like that of a hungry family that cooked and ate its pet dog after it had become roadkill, he explored the phenomenon of moral dumbfounding (when people feel strongly that something is wrong but cannot explain why.)

Dumbfounding led him to view morality as driven by two separate mental systems, one ancient and one modern, though the mind is scarcely aware of the difference. The ancient system, which he calls moral intuition, is based on the emotion-laden moral behaviors that evolved before the development of language. The modern system --he calls it moral judgment -- came after language, when people became able to articulate why something was right or wrong.

The emotional responses of moral intuition occur instantaneously --they are primitive gut reactions that evolved to generate split-second decisions and enhance survival in a dangerous world. Moral judgment, on the other hand, comes later, as the conscious mind develops a plausible rationalization for the decision already arrived at through moral intuition.

Moral dumbfounding, in Dr. Haidt's view, occurs when moral judgment fails to come up with a convincing explanation for what moral intuition has decided.

So why has evolution equipped the brain with two moral systems when just one might seem plenty?

"We have a complex animal mind that only recently evolved language and language-based reasoning," Dr. Haidt said. "No way was control of the organism going to be handed over to this novel faculty."

He likens the mind¹s subterranean moral machinery to an elephant, and conscious moral reasoning to a small rider on the elephant's back. Psychologists and philosophers have long taken a far too narrow view of morality, he believes, because they have focused on the rider and largely ignored the elephant.

Dr. Haidt developed a better sense of the elephant after visiting India at the suggestion of an anthropologist, Richard Shweder. In Bhubaneswar, in the Indian state of Orissa, Dr. Haidt saw that people recognized a much wider moral domain than the issues of harm and justice that are central to Western morality. Indians were concerned with integrating the community through rituals and committed to concepts of religious purity as a way to restrain behavior.

On his return from India, Dr. Haidt combed the literature of anthropology and psychology for ideas about morality throughout the world. He identified five components of morality that were common to most cultures. Some concerned the protection of individuals, others the ties that bind a group together.

Of the moral systems that protect individuals, one is concerned with preventing harm to the person and the other with reciprocity and fairness. Less familiar are the three systems that promote behaviors developed for strengthening the group. These are loyalty to the in-group, respect for authority and hierarchy, and a sense of purity or sanctity.

The five moral systems, in Dr. Haidt's view, are innate psychological mechanisms that predispose children to absorb certain virtues. Because these virtues are learned, morality may vary widely from culture to culture, while maintaining its central role of restraining selfishness. In Western societies, the focus is on protecting individuals by insisting that everyone be treated fairly. Creativity is high, but society is less orderly. In many other societies, selfishness is suppressed "through practices, rituals and stories that help a person play a cooperative role in a larger social entity,"Dr. Haidt said.

He is aware that many people --including "the politically homogeneous discipline of psychology" -- equate morality with justice, rights and the welfare of the individual, and dismiss everything else as mere social convention. But many societies around the world do in fact behave as if loyalty, respect for authority and sanctity are moral concepts, Dr. Haidt notes, and this justifies taking a wider view of the moral domain.

The idea that morality and sacredness are intertwined, he said, may now be out of fashion but has a venerable pedigree, tracing back to Emile Durkheim, a founder of sociology.

Dr. Haidt believes that religion has played an important role in human evolution by strengthening and extending the cohesion provided by the moral systems. "If we didn't have religious minds we would not have stepped through the transition to groupishness," he said. "We'd still be just small bands roving around."

Religious behavior may be the result of natural selection, in his view, shaped at a time when early human groups were competing with one another. "Those who found ways to bind themselves together were more successful,"he said.

Dr. Haidt came to recognize the importance of religion by a roundabout route. "I first found divinity in disgust," he writes in his book The Happiness Hypothesis.

The emotion of disgust probably evolved when people became meat eaters and had to learn which foods might be contaminated with bacteria, a problem not presented by plant foods. Disgust was then extended to many other categories, he argues, to people who were unclean, to unacceptable sexual practices and to a wide class of bodily functions and behaviors that were seen as separating humans from animals.

"Imagine visiting a town," Dr. Haidt writes, "where people wear no clothes, never bathe, have sex 'doggie style' in public, and eat raw meat by biting off pieces directly from the carcass."

He sees the disgust evoked by such a scene as allied to notions of physical and religious purity. Purity is, in his view, a moral system that promotes the goals of controlling selfish desires and acting in a religiously approved way.

Notions of disgust and purity are widespread outside Western cultures. "Educated liberals are the only group to say, 'I find that disgusting but that doesn't make it wrong,'" Dr. Haidt said.

Working with a graduate student, Jesse Graham, Dr. Haidt has detected a striking political dimension to morality. He and Mr. Graham asked people to identify their position on a liberal-conservative spectrum and then complete a questionnaire that assessed the importance attached to each of the five moral systems. (The test, called the moral foundations questionnaire, can be taken online, at www.YourMorals.org.)

They found that people who identified themselves as liberals attached great weight to the two moral systems protective of individuals --those of not harming others and of doing as you would be done by. But liberals assigned much less importance to the three moral systems that protect the group, those of loyalty, respect for authority and purity.

Conservatives placed value on all five moral systems but they assigned less weight than liberals to the moralities protective of individuals.

Dr. Haidt believes that many political disagreements between liberals and conservatives may reflect the different emphasis each places on the five moral categories.

Take attitudes to contemporary art and music. Conservatives fear that subversive art will undermine authority, violate the in-group's traditions and offend canons of purity and sanctity. Liberals, on the other hand, see contemporary art as protecting equality by assailing the establishment, especially if the art is by oppressed groups.

Extreme liberals, Dr. Haidt argues, attach almost no importance to the moral systems that protect the group. Because conservatives do give some weight to individual protections, they often have a better understanding of liberal views than liberals do of conservative attitudes, in his view.

Dr. Haidt, who describes himself as a moderate liberal, says that societies need people with both types of personality. "A liberal morality will encourage much greater creativity but will weaken social structure and deplete social capital," he said. "I am really glad we have New York and San Francisco --most of our creativity comes out of cities like these. But a nation that was just New York and San Francisco could not survive very long. Conservatives give more to charity and tend to be more supportive of essential institutions like the military and law enforcement."

Other psychologists have mixed views about Dr. Haidt's ideas.

Steven Pinker, a cognitive scientist at Harvard, said, "I'm a big fan of Haidt's work." He added that the idea of including purity in the moral domain could make psychological sense even if purity had no place in moral reasoning.

But Frans B. M. de Waal, a primatologist at Emory University, said he disagreed with Dr. Haidt's view that the task of morality is to suppress selfishness. Many animals show empathy and altruistic tendencies but do not have moral systems.

"For me, the moral system is one that resolves the tension between individual and group interests in a way that seems best for the most members of the group, hence promotes a give and take,"Dr. de Waal said.

He said that he also disagreed with Dr. Haidt¹s alignment of liberals with individual rights and conservatives with social cohesiveness.

"It is obvious that liberals emphasize the common good --safety laws for coal mines, health care for all, support for the poor -- that are not nearly as well recognized by conservatives," Dr. de Waal said.

That alignment also bothers John T. Jost, a political psychologist at New York University. Dr. Jost said he admired Dr. Haidt as a "very interesting and creative social psychologist" and found his work useful in drawing attention to the strong moral element in political beliefs.

But the fact that liberals and conservatives agree on the first two of Dr. Haidt's principles --do no harm and do unto others as you would have them do unto you ‹ means that those are good candidates to be moral virtues. The fact that liberals and conservatives disagree on the other three principles "suggests to me that they are not general moral virtues but specific ideological commitments or values," Dr. Jost said.

In defense of his views, Dr. Haidt said that moral claims could be valid even if not universally acknowledged.

"It is at least possible," he said, "that conservatives and traditional societies have some moral or sociological insights that secular liberals do not understand."

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New York Times http://
Contribution #2612

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Source type: Periodical
New York Times http://
Contribution #2612


Morality, Spirituality, and Communications Technology
For the first time in human history, we have communication technologies that combine the best of oral tradition and the written word. For the first time, utter strangers thousands of miles apart can exchange ideas and information via living documents that evolve continuously.  What are the implications for our moral and spiritual dialogue?

When moral and spiritual ideas were handed down via oral tradition, they could evolve with the cultural and technological context in which they existed.  Some stories were repeated often around the fire while others, less favored, eventually faded into the hazy past.  Uninteresting details might be omitted by the storyteller, others elaborated.  New implications might be extracted—rules, roles, and ideas about the natural world--depending on the needs of the era.  The gods themselves matured.

The advent of writing changed this.  On the one hand, writing was one of humanity’s most powerful inventions.  It allowed information to be transmitted directly between people who didn’t know each other.  It allowed knowledge to accumulate.  But it also allowed ideas –especially those that couldn’t be tested—to stagnate.  Written words are frozen in time, a snapshot of the mind of the writer at a specific point in history.  Allegiance to a set of civic, moral or spiritual writings allows a person or a group of people to become developmentally arrested, bound to the insights and limitations of the authors.

Canonization, the process by which an authoritative body designates a specific set of writings as complete, perfect, or more holy than all others, makes this worse.  Prior to canonization, a single fragment of text may be static but the mix can evolve, with some documents moving to the fore and others falling out of favor, perhaps being lost altogether.  Canonization freezes the mix, giving priority not only to the written word, but to a specific set of written words that have received the blessing of a specific human hierarchy. 

Ironically, the invention of the printing press, a world changing wonder insomuch as it accelerated the growth and spread of human knowledge, made even worse the opportunities for developmental arrest.  By making a static set of sacred texts widely available, it removed yet another form of flexibility and spiritual/moral growth.  Clergy could no longer selectively emphasize those canonical texts that fit the moral consciousness of a given time period (omitting the rest), without losing their authority in the minds of many adherents.   Some scholars have suggested that fundamentalism had its birth in the invention of the printing press, and that its spread across the planet region by region, religion by religion, has paralleled the growth of literacy.

This leads to two conclusions:

1:  Religious fundamentalism, a phenomenon that many consider one of the top current threats to our longevity as a species, can be thought of as problem of communication technology.  Specifically, it may be thought of as book worship or, in religious terms, bibliolatry.   Recall that an idol is an object (shaped by human minds and hands) that attempts to represent and communicate the essence of divinity.  For pre-literate people, statues, images, icons, and sacred spaces filled this role.   In an age of mobility and literacy, what better idol than a book?  And what more likely idolatry than bibliolatry?

2:  As a problem that originated in communications technology, the nuclear standoff of tribal fundamentalisms in which we live may be transcended also by communications technology.  Problems introduced by technological evolution frequently are solved by further technological evolution.  In fact, I might argue that they are rarely solved otherwise. 

In this light it is tremendously exciting that now, for the first time in human history, we have communication technologies that combine the best of oral tradition and the written word.  For the first time, utter strangers thousands of miles apart can exchange ideas and information via living documents that evolve continuously.

A book, they say, is out of date the day it is in print.  Not so with the Web.  Web 2.0 allows an individual text to evolve the way that oral instruction once did.  Wikipedia articles change daily as new information becomes available.  The Web also re-opens  evolution at the level of the collection—a rich, indexed, ever-changing  library replaces a canonical list of authoritative texts. 

Savvy, entrepreneurial fundamentalists have latched onto new web technologies as a means of dispersing the words and world view of our Bronze Age ancestors, just as their ideological forebears did with the printing press.   But in their devotion to this world view they miss the stunning opportunity we have been given. 

Now as never before we have the means to honor not the answers of our spiritual ancestors but their questions:  What is Real?  What is Good?  How can we live in moral community with each other?  Because we have moved beyond the age of the book and of sacred books, we have the means to make this a conversation, not of a priestly class nor of a single culture, but of scholars and seekers and life lovers from every part of this precious planet.  Together we can take the conversation from where it got stuck and set it free once more to flow forward on the currents of human need and knowledge.  

Morality, Spirituality, and Communications Technology

When moral and spiritual ideas were handed down via oral tradition, they could evolve with the cultural and technological context in which they existed.  Some stories were repeated often around the fire while others, less favored, eventually faded into the hazy past.  Uninteresting details might be omitted by the storyteller, others elaborated.  New implications might be extracted—rules, roles, and ideas about the natural world--depending on the needs of the era.  The gods themselves matured.

The advent of writing changed this.  On the one hand, writing was one of humanity’s most powerful inventions.  It allowed information to be transmitted directly between people who didn’t know each other.  It allowed knowledge to accumulate.  But it also allowed ideas –especially those that couldn’t be tested—to stagnate.  Written words are frozen in time, a snapshot of the mind of the writer at a specific point in history.  Allegiance to a set of civic, moral or spiritual writings allows a person or a group of people to become developmentally arrested, bound to the insights and limitations of the authors.

Canonization, the process by which an authoritative body designates a specific set of writings as complete, perfect, or more holy than all others, makes this worse.  Prior to canonization, a single fragment of text may be static but the mix can evolve, with some documents moving to the fore and others falling out of favor, perhaps being lost altogether.  Canonization freezes the mix, giving priority not only to the written word, but to a specific set of written words that have received the blessing of a specific human hierarchy. 

Ironically, the invention of the printing press, a world changing wonder insomuch as it accelerated the growth and spread of human knowledge, made even worse the opportunities for developmental arrest.  By making a static set of sacred texts widely available, it removed yet another form of flexibility and spiritual/moral growth.  Clergy could no longer selectively emphasize those canonical texts that fit the moral consciousness of a given time period (omitting the rest), without losing their authority in the minds of many adherents.   Some scholars have suggested that fundamentalism had its birth in the invention of the printing press, and that its spread across the planet region by region, religion by religion, has paralleled the growth of literacy.

This leads to two conclusions:

1:  Religious fundamentalism, a phenomenon that many consider one of the top current threats to our longevity as a species, can be thought of as problem of communication technology.  Specifically, it may be thought of as book worship or, in religious terms, bibliolatry.   Recall that an idol is an object (shaped by human minds and hands) that attempts to represent and communicate the essence of divinity.  For pre-literate people, statues, images, icons, and sacred spaces filled this role.   In an age of mobility and literacy, what better idol than a book?  And what more likely idolatry than bibliolatry?

2:  As a problem that originated in communications technology, the nuclear standoff of tribal fundamentalisms in which we live may be transcended also by communications technology.  Problems introduced by technological evolution frequently are solved by further technological evolution.  In fact, I might argue that they are rarely solved otherwise. 

In this light it is tremendously exciting that now, for the first time in human history, we have communication technologies that combine the best of oral tradition and the written word.  For the first time, utter strangers thousands of miles apart can exchange ideas and information via living documents that evolve continuously.

A book, they say, is out of date the day it is in print.  Not so with the Web.  Web 2.0 allows an individual text to evolve the way that oral instruction once did.  Wikipedia articles change daily as new information becomes available.  The Web also re-opens  evolution at the level of the collection—a rich, indexed, ever-changing  library replaces a canonical list of authoritative texts. 

Savvy, entrepreneurial fundamentalists have latched onto new web technologies as a means of dispersing the words and world view of our Bronze Age ancestors, just as their ideological forebears did with the printing press.   But in their devotion to this world view they miss the stunning opportunity we have been given. 

Now as never before we have the means to honor not the answers of our spiritual ancestors but their questions:  What is Real?  What is Good?  How can we live in moral community with each other?  Because we have moved beyond the age of the book and of sacred books, we have the means to make this a conversation, not of a priestly class nor of a single culture, but of scholars and seekers and life lovers from every part of this precious planet.  Together we can take the conversation from where it got stuck and set it free once more to flow forward on the currents of human need and knowledge.  

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The theory of free speech, that truth is so much larger and stranger and more many-sided than we know of, that it is very much better at all costs to hear everyone's account of it, is a theory which has been justified on the whole by experiment, but which remains a very daring and even a very surprising theory.
It is really one of the great discoveries of the modern time.

The theory of free speech, that truth is so much larger and stranger and more many-sided than we know of, that it is very much better at all costs to hear everyone's account of it, is a theory which has been justified on the whole by experiment, but which remains a very daring and even a very surprising theory.
It is really one of the great discoveries of the modern time.
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A New Deuteronomy: Ten Pillars for our Civilization
There are certain salient principles, valid always but of special relevance today, which we should take particular care to uphold. They are the Ten Pillars of our Civilization; or, to put in another way, a new and secular Ten Commandments, designed not, indeed, to replace the old, but rather to update and reinforce their social message.

      The first, and perhaps the most important, is to reassert our belief in moral absolutes . . . .

On the last day of 1911, Wilfred Scawen Blunt, the poet and propagandist for the subject peoples - the first of the modern anti-colonialists - made a despondent entry in his diary:

Today a sad year ends, the worst politically I can remember since the 1880s, bloodshed, massacre and destruction everywhere, and all accepted in England with a cynical approval, our Foreign Office being accomplice with the evil-doers, and Grey [Foreign Secretary] their apologist. It has been a losing battle in which I have fought long and hard, but with no result of good. I am old, and weary, and discouraged, and would if I could slink out of the fight. I am useless in the face of an entirely hostile world.

At the end of the 1970s, virtually everything that Blunt campaigned for, in what he then thought a hopeless struggle, has been triumphantly accomplished. The British empire he hated, which he regarded as an evil conspiracy against the weak and innocent coloured peoples of the world, is now 'at one with Nineveh and Tyre'. Africa has been unscrambled, Asia 'liberated', sovereignty awarded to more than a hundred nations which, in Blunt's day, were administered by European officials. The world he knew and deplored had been erased from the map, in the greatest transfer of power in human history; and almost all the dominant values and assumptions of 1911 have been cast aside or inverted. The 'hostile world' has dissolved as if it had never been, and Blunt's views have become the prevailing wisdom of our planet.

Yet it is difficult to argue that civilization is any richer, or more secure, than it was then. 'Bloodshed, massacre, and destruction everywhere': the phrase applies as well, or better, to our times, as to his. New tyrannies have replaced old ones, and fresh injustices have been generously heaped on the heads of countless innocents in every quarter of the earth. Few sensitive souls can look around the world today with feelings of satisfaction, or optimism. This is not to say that the revolution through which we have passed could and should have been prevented; on the contrary, it was both just and inevitable. But the events of this century should remind us that the hopes of mankind almost always prove illusory, and that we have only a limited ability to devise permanent and equitable solutions to problems which spring from human nature. Violence, shortage amid plenty, tyranny and the cruelty it breeds, the gross stupidities of the powerful, the indifference of the well-to-do, the divisions of the intelligent and well-meaning, the apathy of the wretched multitude - these things will be with us to the end of the race.

Hence civilization will always be at risk, and every age is prudent to regard the threats to it with unique seriousness. All good societies breed enemies whose combined hostility can prove fatal. There is no easy defensive formula, and the most effective strategy is to identify the malign forces quickly, as and when they appear. That has been the chief purpose of this book. At the same time, there are certain salient principles, valid always but of special relevance today, which we should take particular care to uphold. They are the Ten Pillars of our Civilization; or, to put in another way, a new and secular Ten Commandments, designed not, indeed, to replace the old, but rather to update and reinforce their social message.

The first, and perhaps the most important, is to reassert our belief in moral absolutes. It is not true that all codes of human conduct are relative, and reflect cultural assumptions and economic arrangements which do not necessarily possess any authority. It is not true that there is no such thing as absolute right, and absolute wrong. It is not true that our behavior is wholly determined by environment. Nor is it true that to seek to impose moral norms is an arrogant and unwarrantable assumption of infallibility; on the contrary, in the long run it is a necessary condition of human happiness, and even of human survival. What is true is that every rational human being is in a moral sense free, capable of reacting to moral absolutes, and of opting for good or evil.

It follows from this that certain acts are intrinsically, always and everywhere wrong. Murder is always wrong. Thus anyone who tries to justify political violence, the greatest single evil of our age, must automatically be suspect as an enemy of our society. In fact the theories which attempt to legitimize killing in the pursuit of political objectives are, without exception, founded on false premises, illogical or rest on deliberate linguistic conjuring. Hence there is a natural presumption that anyone seeking to circumvent the common opinion that violence is wicked is an intellectual crook; as John Ralwe put it in A Theory of Justice: 'On a subject as ancient and much discussed... we may probably assume that a novel, and hence interesting, view of violence is likely to be false.' Moreover, a propagandist or pedagogue who is wrong about violence is almost certainly wrong about all his other claims to truth. The virtue we should cherish most is the courage to resist violence, especially if this involves flying in the face of public opinion which, in its fear, and in its anxiety for peace, is willing to appease the violators. Above all, violence should never be allowed to pay, or be seen to pay.

The third moral axiom is that democracy is the least evil, and on the whole the most effective, from of government. Democracy is an important factor in the material success of a society, and especially in its living-standards. But of course the essence of democracy is not one-man-one-vote, which does not necessarily have anything to do with individual freedom, or democratic control. The exaltation of 'majority rule' on the basis of universal suffrage is the most strident political fallacy of the twentieth century. True democracy means the ability to remove a government without violence without violence, to punish political failure or misjudgment by votes alone. A democracy is a utilitarian instrument of social control; it is valuable in so far as it works. Its object is to promote human content; but perhaps this is more likely to be secured if the aim is rephrased. As Karl Popper says, the art of politics is the minimization of unhappiness, or avoidable suffering. The identification of the cause and scale of suffering draws attention to, and defines, problems in society; and, since man is a problem-solving creature, eventually gets something done about them. The process of avoiding suffering is greatly assisted by the existence of free institutions. The greater their number, variety and intrinsic strength, and the greater their independence, the more effective the democracy which harbours them will be. All such institutions should be treated like fortresses: that is, soundly constructed and continually manned.

Free institutions will only survive where there is the rule of law. This is an absolute on which there can be no compromise: the subjection of everyone and everything to the final arbitration of the law is more fundamental to human freedom and happiness than democracy itself. Most of the post-war democratic institutions have foundered because the rule of law was broken and governments placed themselves about the courts. Once the law is humbled, all else that is valuable to a civilized society will vanish, usually with terrifying speed. On the other hand, provided the rule of law is maintained intact, the evil forces in society, however powerful, will be brought to book in the end - as witness the downfall of the Nixon administration. The United Nations has proved not merely a failure, but a positive obstacle to peace and justice, because it has put the principle of one-nation-one-vote above the rule of law, including its own. But the rule of law is essential, not merely to preserve liberty, but to increase wealth. A law which is supreme, impartial and accessible to all is the only guarantee that property, corporate or personal, will be safe; and therefore a necessary incentive to saving and investment.

The fifth salient rule is always, and in all situations, to stress the importance of the individual. Where individual and corporate rights conflict, the political balance should usually be weighted in favor of the individual; for civilizations are created, and maintained, not by corporations, however benign, but my multitudes and multitudes of individuals, operating independently. We have seen how, under the Roman empire, political and economic freedom declined, pari passu, with the growth of the corporations, and their organization by the state. The Roman concept of the collegia survived; it was built into the Christian church, and so was carried over into the Dark Age towns and into the guilds of medieval and early modern society. Guild-forms were eventually transmuted into trade unions. The liberal epoch, which occurred after the powers of the guilds has been effectively curbed, and before the powers of the unions had been established, was thus a blessed and fruitful interval between the two tyrannies - fruitful, indeed, because it produced the Industrial Revolution, the first economic take-off, and thus taught the world how to achieve self-sustaining economic growth. The trade union is now increasing its economic power and its political influence faster than any other institutions in western society. It is not wholly malevolent, but is has certain increasingly reprehensible characteristics. One is that it claims, and gets, legal privilege; it thus breaks our forth commandment, the rule of law. Another is that it curbs the elitist urge in man, the very essence of civilization, and quite deliberately and exultantly reinforces the average. As Ortega Y Gasset puts it, in The Revolt of the Masses, 'The chief characteristic of our time is that the mediocre mind, aware of its own mediocrity, has the boldness to assert the rights of mediocrity and to impose them everywhere." Such an actual or potential menace to our culture can be contained, provided we keep this commandment strictly, and protect the individual against corporatism.

The sixth of our rules is that there is nothing morally unhealthy about the existence of a middle class in society. No one need feel ashamed of being bourgeois, of pursuing a bourgeois way of life, or of adhering to bourgeois cultural and moral standards. That it should be necessary to assert such a proposition is a curious commentary on our age, and in particular its mania for the lowest common denominator of social uniformity. Throughout history all intelligent observers of society have welcomed the emergence of a flourishing middle-class, which they have rightly associated with economic prosperity, political stability, the growth of individual freedom and the raising of moral and cultural standards. The middle class, stretching from the self-employed skilled craftsman to the leaders of the learned professions, has produced the overwhelming majority of the painters, architects, writers, and musicians, as well as the administrators, technologists and scientists, on which the quality and strength of a culture principally rest. The health of the middle class is probably the best index of the health of a society as a whole; and any political system which persecutes its middle class systematically is unlikely to remain either free or prosperous for long.

We have seen that there is a close connection between the rise of the middle class, and the growth of political and economic freedom. But it is not true, as Lenin contemptuously asserted, that 'freedom is a bourgeois prejudice'. Freedom is a good which any rational man knows how to value, whatever his social origins, occupation or economic prospects. Throughout history, the attachment of even the humblest people to their freedom, above all their freedom to earn their livings how and where they please, has come as an unpleasant shock to condescending ideologues. We need not suppose that the exercise of freedom is bought at the expense of any deserving class or interest - only of those with the itch to tyrannize. So the seventh commandment is that, when the claims of freedom conflict with the pursuit of other desirable objects of public policy, freedom should normally prevail; society should have a rational and an emotional disposition in its favour. In our times, liberty's chief conflict has been with equality. But absolute equality is not a good at all; it is a chimera, and if it existed would prove as fearful and destructive a monster as that grotesque creature Bellerophon killed. And the regarding and indiscriminate pursuit of relative equality, itself desirable, has led to many unwarranted restrictions on human freedom without attaining its object. In short, for many years the bias has been in the wrong direction, and it is now necessary to strike a new balance of moral good by redressing it. Where there is genuine doubt between the legitimate claims of liberty and equality, the decision taken should be the one most easily reversed if it proves mistaken.

When we are dealing with concepts like freedom and equality, it is essential to use words accurately and in good faith. So the eighth commandment is: beware of those who seek to win an argument at the expense of the language. For the fact that they do is proof positive that their argument is false, and proof presumptive that they know it is. A man who deliberately inflicts violence on the language will almost certainly inflict violence on human beings if he acquires the power. Those who treasure the meaning of words will treasure truth, and those who bend words to their purposes are very likely in pursuit of anti-social ones. The correct and honourable use of words is the first and natural credential of civilized status.

Of course using words in their true sense is one element in precision of thought. And trained skill in thinking precisely to advance knowledge is what we mean by science. So the ninth commandment is: trust science. By this we mean a true science, based on objectively established criteria and agreed foundations, with a rational methodology and mature criteria of proof - not the multitude of pseudo-sciences which, as we have seen, have marked characteristics which can easily be detected and exposed. Science, properly defined, is an essential part of civilization. To be anti-science is not the mark of a civilized human being, or of a friend of humanity. Given the right safeguards and standards, the progress of science constitutes our best hope for the future, and anyone who denies this proposition is an enemy of science.

The last of our laws follows from the ninth, and in a sense embraces them all. It is this: no consideration should ever deflect us from the pursuit and recognition of truth, for that essentially is what constitutes civilization itself. There are many around today who concede, in theory, that truth is indivisible; but then insist, in practice, that some truths are more divisible than others. If we want to identify a social enemy we need go no further than examine his attitude to truth: it will always give him away; for, as Pascal says, 'The worst thing of all is when man begins to fear the truth, lest it denounce him.' But truth is much more than a means to expose the malevolent. It is the great creative force of civilization. For truth is knowledge; and a civilized man is one who, in Hobbes' words, has a 'perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge.' Hobbes also writes: 'Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability, is that exaltation of mind called glorying.' And so it is; for the pursuit of truth is our civilization's glory, and the joy we obtain from it is the nearest we shall approach to happiness, at least on this side of the grave. If we are steadfast in this aim, we need not fear the enemies of society.

A New Deuteronomy: Ten Pillars for our Civilization

On the last day of 1911, Wilfred Scawen Blunt, the poet and propagandist for the subject peoples - the first of the modern anti-colonialists - made a despondent entry in his diary:

Today a sad year ends, the worst politically I can remember since the 1880s, bloodshed, massacre and destruction everywhere, and all accepted in England with a cynical approval, our Foreign Office being accomplice with the evil-doers, and Grey [Foreign Secretary] their apologist. It has been a losing battle in which I have fought long and hard, but with no result of good. I am old, and weary, and discouraged, and would if I could slink out of the fight. I am useless in the face of an entirely hostile world.

At the end of the 1970s, virtually everything that Blunt campaigned for, in what he then thought a hopeless struggle, has been triumphantly accomplished. The British empire he hated, which he regarded as an evil conspiracy against the weak and innocent coloured peoples of the world, is now 'at one with Nineveh and Tyre'. Africa has been unscrambled, Asia 'liberated', sovereignty awarded to more than a hundred nations which, in Blunt's day, were administered by European officials. The world he knew and deplored had been erased from the map, in the greatest transfer of power in human history; and almost all the dominant values and assumptions of 1911 have been cast aside or inverted. The 'hostile world' has dissolved as if it had never been, and Blunt's views have become the prevailing wisdom of our planet.

Yet it is difficult to argue that civilization is any richer, or more secure, than it was then. 'Bloodshed, massacre, and destruction everywhere': the phrase applies as well, or better, to our times, as to his. New tyrannies have replaced old ones, and fresh injustices have been generously heaped on the heads of countless innocents in every quarter of the earth. Few sensitive souls can look around the world today with feelings of satisfaction, or optimism. This is not to say that the revolution through which we have passed could and should have been prevented; on the contrary, it was both just and inevitable. But the events of this century should remind us that the hopes of mankind almost always prove illusory, and that we have only a limited ability to devise permanent and equitable solutions to problems which spring from human nature. Violence, shortage amid plenty, tyranny and the cruelty it breeds, the gross stupidities of the powerful, the indifference of the well-to-do, the divisions of the intelligent and well-meaning, the apathy of the wretched multitude - these things will be with us to the end of the race.

Hence civilization will always be at risk, and every age is prudent to regard the threats to it with unique seriousness. All good societies breed enemies whose combined hostility can prove fatal. There is no easy defensive formula, and the most effective strategy is to identify the malign forces quickly, as and when they appear. That has been the chief purpose of this book. At the same time, there are certain salient principles, valid always but of special relevance today, which we should take particular care to uphold. They are the Ten Pillars of our Civilization; or, to put in another way, a new and secular Ten Commandments, designed not, indeed, to replace the old, but rather to update and reinforce their social message.

The first, and perhaps the most important, is to reassert our belief in moral absolutes. It is not true that all codes of human conduct are relative, and reflect cultural assumptions and economic arrangements which do not necessarily possess any authority. It is not true that there is no such thing as absolute right, and absolute wrong. It is not true that our behavior is wholly determined by environment. Nor is it true that to seek to impose moral norms is an arrogant and unwarrantable assumption of infallibility; on the contrary, in the long run it is a necessary condition of human happiness, and even of human survival. What is true is that every rational human being is in a moral sense free, capable of reacting to moral absolutes, and of opting for good or evil.

It follows from this that certain acts are intrinsically, always and everywhere wrong. Murder is always wrong. Thus anyone who tries to justify political violence, the greatest single evil of our age, must automatically be suspect as an enemy of our society. In fact the theories which attempt to legitimize killing in the pursuit of political objectives are, without exception, founded on false premises, illogical or rest on deliberate linguistic conjuring. Hence there is a natural presumption that anyone seeking to circumvent the common opinion that violence is wicked is an intellectual crook; as John Ralwe put it in A Theory of Justice: 'On a subject as ancient and much discussed... we may probably assume that a novel, and hence interesting, view of violence is likely to be false.' Moreover, a propagandist or pedagogue who is wrong about violence is almost certainly wrong about all his other claims to truth. The virtue we should cherish most is the courage to resist violence, especially if this involves flying in the face of public opinion which, in its fear, and in its anxiety for peace, is willing to appease the violators. Above all, violence should never be allowed to pay, or be seen to pay.

The third moral axiom is that democracy is the least evil, and on the whole the most effective, from of government. Democracy is an important factor in the material success of a society, and especially in its living-standards. But of course the essence of democracy is not one-man-one-vote, which does not necessarily have anything to do with individual freedom, or democratic control. The exaltation of 'majority rule' on the basis of universal suffrage is the most strident political fallacy of the twentieth century. True democracy means the ability to remove a government without violence without violence, to punish political failure or misjudgment by votes alone. A democracy is a utilitarian instrument of social control; it is valuable in so far as it works. Its object is to promote human content; but perhaps this is more likely to be secured if the aim is rephrased. As Karl Popper says, the art of politics is the minimization of unhappiness, or avoidable suffering. The identification of the cause and scale of suffering draws attention to, and defines, problems in society; and, since man is a problem-solving creature, eventually gets something done about them. The process of avoiding suffering is greatly assisted by the existence of free institutions. The greater their number, variety and intrinsic strength, and the greater their independence, the more effective the democracy which harbours them will be. All such institutions should be treated like fortresses: that is, soundly constructed and continually manned.

Free institutions will only survive where there is the rule of law. This is an absolute on which there can be no compromise: the subjection of everyone and everything to the final arbitration of the law is more fundamental to human freedom and happiness than democracy itself. Most of the post-war democratic institutions have foundered because the rule of law was broken and governments placed themselves about the courts. Once the law is humbled, all else that is valuable to a civilized society will vanish, usually with terrifying speed. On the other hand, provided the rule of law is maintained intact, the evil forces in society, however powerful, will be brought to book in the end - as witness the downfall of the Nixon administration. The United Nations has proved not merely a failure, but a positive obstacle to peace and justice, because it has put the principle of one-nation-one-vote above the rule of law, including its own. But the rule of law is essential, not merely to preserve liberty, but to increase wealth. A law which is supreme, impartial and accessible to all is the only guarantee that property, corporate or personal, will be safe; and therefore a necessary incentive to saving and investment.

The fifth salient rule is always, and in all situations, to stress the importance of the individual. Where individual and corporate rights conflict, the political balance should usually be weighted in favor of the individual; for civilizations are created, and maintained, not by corporations, however benign, but my multitudes and multitudes of individuals, operating independently. We have seen how, under the Roman empire, political and economic freedom declined, pari passu, with the growth of the corporations, and their organization by the state. The Roman concept of the collegia survived; it was built into the Christian church, and so was carried over into the Dark Age towns and into the guilds of medieval and early modern society. Guild-forms were eventually transmuted into trade unions. The liberal epoch, which occurred after the powers of the guilds has been effectively curbed, and before the powers of the unions had been established, was thus a blessed and fruitful interval between the two tyrannies - fruitful, indeed, because it produced the Industrial Revolution, the first economic take-off, and thus taught the world how to achieve self-sustaining economic growth. The trade union is now increasing its economic power and its political influence faster than any other institutions in western society. It is not wholly malevolent, but is has certain increasingly reprehensible characteristics. One is that it claims, and gets, legal privilege; it thus breaks our forth commandment, the rule of law. Another is that it curbs the elitist urge in man, the very essence of civilization, and quite deliberately and exultantly reinforces the average. As Ortega Y Gasset puts it, in The Revolt of the Masses, 'The chief characteristic of our time is that the mediocre mind, aware of its own mediocrity, has the boldness to assert the rights of mediocrity and to impose them everywhere." Such an actual or potential menace to our culture can be contained, provided we keep this commandment strictly, and protect the individual against corporatism.

The sixth of our rules is that there is nothing morally unhealthy about the existence of a middle class in society. No one need feel ashamed of being bourgeois, of pursuing a bourgeois way of life, or of adhering to bourgeois cultural and moral standards. That it should be necessary to assert such a proposition is a curious commentary on our age, and in particular its mania for the lowest common denominator of social uniformity. Throughout history all intelligent observers of society have welcomed the emergence of a flourishing middle-class, which they have rightly associated with economic prosperity, political stability, the growth of individual freedom and the raising of moral and cultural standards. The middle class, stretching from the self-employed skilled craftsman to the leaders of the learned professions, has produced the overwhelming majority of the painters, architects, writers, and musicians, as well as the administrators, technologists and scientists, on which the quality and strength of a culture principally rest. The health of the middle class is probably the best index of the health of a society as a whole; and any political system which persecutes its middle class systematically is unlikely to remain either free or prosperous for long.

We have seen that there is a close connection between the rise of the middle class, and the growth of political and economic freedom. But it is not true, as Lenin contemptuously asserted, that 'freedom is a bourgeois prejudice'. Freedom is a good which any rational man knows how to value, whatever his social origins, occupation or economic prospects. Throughout history, the attachment of even the humblest people to their freedom, above all their freedom to earn their livings how and where they please, has come as an unpleasant shock to condescending ideologues. We need not suppose that the exercise of freedom is bought at the expense of any deserving class or interest - only of those with the itch to tyrannize. So the seventh commandment is that, when the claims of freedom conflict with the pursuit of other desirable objects of public policy, freedom should normally prevail; society should have a rational and an emotional disposition in its favour. In our times, liberty's chief conflict has been with equality. But absolute equality is not a good at all; it is a chimera, and if it existed would prove as fearful and destructive a monster as that grotesque creature Bellerophon killed. And the regarding and indiscriminate pursuit of relative equality, itself desirable, has led to many unwarranted restrictions on human freedom without attaining its object. In short, for many years the bias has been in the wrong direction, and it is now necessary to strike a new balance of moral good by redressing it. Where there is genuine doubt between the legitimate claims of liberty and equality, the decision taken should be the one most easily reversed if it proves mistaken.

When we are dealing with concepts like freedom and equality, it is essential to use words accurately and in good faith. So the eighth commandment is: beware of those who seek to win an argument at the expense of the language. For the fact that they do is proof positive that their argument is false, and proof presumptive that they know it is. A man who deliberately inflicts violence on the language will almost certainly inflict violence on human beings if he acquires the power. Those who treasure the meaning of words will treasure truth, and those who bend words to their purposes are very likely in pursuit of anti-social ones. The correct and honourable use of words is the first and natural credential of civilized status.

Of course using words in their true sense is one element in precision of thought. And trained skill in thinking precisely to advance knowledge is what we mean by science. So the ninth commandment is: trust science. By this we mean a true science, based on objectively established criteria and agreed foundations, with a rational methodology and mature criteria of proof - not the multitude of pseudo-sciences which, as we have seen, have marked characteristics which can easily be detected and exposed. Science, properly defined, is an essential part of civilization. To be anti-science is not the mark of a civilized human being, or of a friend of humanity. Given the right safeguards and standards, the progress of science constitutes our best hope for the future, and anyone who denies this proposition is an enemy of science.

The last of our laws follows from the ninth, and in a sense embraces them all. It is this: no consideration should ever deflect us from the pursuit and recognition of truth, for that essentially is what constitutes civilization itself. There are many around today who concede, in theory, that truth is indivisible; but then insist, in practice, that some truths are more divisible than others. If we want to identify a social enemy we need go no further than examine his attitude to truth: it will always give him away; for, as Pascal says, 'The worst thing of all is when man begins to fear the truth, lest it denounce him.' But truth is much more than a means to expose the malevolent. It is the great creative force of civilization. For truth is knowledge; and a civilized man is one who, in Hobbes' words, has a 'perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge.' Hobbes also writes: 'Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability, is that exaltation of mind called glorying.' And so it is; for the pursuit of truth is our civilization's glory, and the joy we obtain from it is the nearest we shall approach to happiness, at least on this side of the grave. If we are steadfast in this aim, we need not fear the enemies of society.

Source type: Book
Enemies of Society
Published in 1977
http://www.rjgeib.com/thoughts/deuteronomy/deuteronomy.html
Contribution #1782

Source (click to close)

Source type: Book
Enemies of Society
Published in 1977
http://www.rjgeib.com/thoughts/deuteronomy/deuteronomy.html
Contribution #1782


Monkey Equity -- an excerpt from Hardwired Behavior
Tancredo describes research showing that brown capuchin monkeys exhibit a sense of equity, and females react to events they perceive as unfair. 
Another interesting gauge of the innateness of a moral sense comes from recent discoveries about primates.  We have known since the 1990's that chimpanzees possess reciprocal altruism (generosity with food and sharing, for example) that is essential for achieving social status.  Along with this, they have also been shown to have a sense of righteousness and justice, abilities that are thought increasingly to be precursors of human morality.(33) But recently researchers at the Yerkes National Primate Center in Atlanta looked at "fairness" based on aversion to inequity and concluded that a critical feature of human cooperation involves comparing one's own efforts and rewards (payoffs) with others. (34)  This, they presume, is a human universal.  However, other animals are cooperative; therefore, inequity aversion is most likely not limited to humans.

The researchers studied how brown capuchin monkeys (five males and five females) respond to unequal rewards when compared with others in their group.  In this eperiment these monkeys were given tokens to be exchanged with an experimenter for a reward.  When monkeys exchanged okens for a slice of cucumber, which is an acceptable reward, there were no problems.  However, if one monkey received a cucumber for a token and another a grape--which has been shown to be a preferred treat at least 90% of the time by these monkeys (35) -- the response was different.

The researchers noted that the males, for no clearly discernible reason, showed little or no difference in response when a favored food item was given to one of them, whereas the females, observing another receiving the desired food item for equal effort, reacted by rejecting the offer.  They were more tuned into issues of fairness.  This rejection took the form of failing to surrender the token and pay for the food, or of accepting the slice of cucumber but refusing to eat it.  If one of the female monkeys was given the grape for no effort, the others would react even more hostilely.  Based on their findings, the researchers concluded that these monkeys have an innate sense of equality and fairness, (36) and that this capacity, which is essential for cooperation, may have evolved in social primates before it did in humans. (37)

Monkey Equity -- an excerpt from Hardwired Behavior

Another interesting gauge of the innateness of a moral sense comes from recent discoveries about primates.  We have known since the 1990's that chimpanzees possess reciprocal altruism (generosity with food and sharing, for example) that is essential for achieving social status.  Along with this, they have also been shown to have a sense of righteousness and justice, abilities that are thought increasingly to be precursors of human morality.(33) But recently researchers at the Yerkes National Primate Center in Atlanta looked at "fairness" based on aversion to inequity and concluded that a critical feature of human cooperation involves comparing one's own efforts and rewards (payoffs) with others. (34)  This, they presume, is a human universal.  However, other animals are cooperative; therefore, inequity aversion is most likely not limited to humans.

The researchers studied how brown capuchin monkeys (five males and five females) respond to unequal rewards when compared with others in their group.  In this eperiment these monkeys were given tokens to be exchanged with an experimenter for a reward.  When monkeys exchanged okens for a slice of cucumber, which is an acceptable reward, there were no problems.  However, if one monkey received a cucumber for a token and another a grape--which has been shown to be a preferred treat at least 90% of the time by these monkeys (35) -- the response was different.

The researchers noted that the males, for no clearly discernible reason, showed little or no difference in response when a favored food item was given to one of them, whereas the females, observing another receiving the desired food item for equal effort, reacted by rejecting the offer.  They were more tuned into issues of fairness.  This rejection took the form of failing to surrender the token and pay for the food, or of accepting the slice of cucumber but refusing to eat it.  If one of the female monkeys was given the grape for no effort, the others would react even more hostilely.  Based on their findings, the researchers concluded that these monkeys have an innate sense of equality and fairness, (36) and that this capacity, which is essential for cooperation, may have evolved in social primates before it did in humans. (37)
Source type: Book
Hardwired Behavior: What neuroscience reveals about morality
by Laurence Tancredo
Page 80-81
Published by Cambridge University Press , Cambridge , 2005
http://
Contribution #1683

Source (click to close)

Source type: Book
Hardwired Behavior: What neuroscience reveals about morality
by Laurence Tancredo
Page 80-81
Published by Cambridge University Press , Cambridge , 2005
http://
Contribution #1683


Head Injuries - an exerpt from Hardwired Behavior
Tancredi describes two individuals who had head injuries in infancy which later impaired their moral behavior.
. . . Another reason for believing that a moral sense is innate comes from studies of infants who have sustained injuries to their prefrontal cortex, particularly the orbitofrontal cortext.  Two adult patients who had been injured before the age of sixteen months were subjects of a study of the long-term effects of early prefrontal cortex injuries.(31)  The first patient, a woman twenty years old at the time of the study, had been injured at the age of fifteen months by being run over by a motor vehicle.  The second was a male of twenty-three who had undergone surgery to remove a frontal tumor at the age of three months.  The families of both of these patients were of the educated middle-class and had no psychiatric histories.

Though the siblings of both patients turned out to be socially well-adapted, the patients themselves demonstrated severe impairment of social behavior involving antisocial acts such as violence, irresponsible and reckless sexual behavior, and stealing.  Furthermore they showed little or no guilt or remorse for their behavior and no evidence of empathy for others.

Unlike those who experienced similar prefrontal injuries whil adults, the two patients injured as infants showed that they were unable to reason in a social and moral context.  They lacked the factual basis and emotional capacity for understanding the morailty of their behavior.  It was as though the corticl control for reward and punishment had been severely compromised, as they were not able to acquire or retrieve the knowledge that depends on the presence of reward and punishment determinations for moral reasoing.  Therefore, although they exhibited some of the same disruptive behavior as those afflicted with prefrontal lobe injuries during adulthood--such as insensitivity to others, unresponsiveness to behavioral interventions, and inability to follow through with plans--they were more seriously afected, as evidenced by their inability to shape a moral issue.

 . . . Furthermore, efforts to educate them about morality and changes in behavior were unsuccessful.  This suggested that whatever capacity the subjects may have possessedbefore birth had been wiped out irreparably by their injuries.


Head Injuries - an exerpt from Hardwired Behavior

. . . Another reason for believing that a moral sense is innate comes from studies of infants who have sustained injuries to their prefrontal cortex, particularly the orbitofrontal cortext.  Two adult patients who had been injured before the age of sixteen months were subjects of a study of the long-term effects of early prefrontal cortex injuries.(31)  The first patient, a woman twenty years old at the time of the study, had been injured at the age of fifteen months by being run over by a motor vehicle.  The second was a male of twenty-three who had undergone surgery to remove a frontal tumor at the age of three months.  The families of both of these patients were of the educated middle-class and had no psychiatric histories.

Though the siblings of both patients turned out to be socially well-adapted, the patients themselves demonstrated severe impairment of social behavior involving antisocial acts such as violence, irresponsible and reckless sexual behavior, and stealing.  Furthermore they showed little or no guilt or remorse for their behavior and no evidence of empathy for others.

Unlike those who experienced similar prefrontal injuries whil adults, the two patients injured as infants showed that they were unable to reason in a social and moral context.  They lacked the factual basis and emotional capacity for understanding the morailty of their behavior.  It was as though the corticl control for reward and punishment had been severely compromised, as they were not able to acquire or retrieve the knowledge that depends on the presence of reward and punishment determinations for moral reasoing.  Therefore, although they exhibited some of the same disruptive behavior as those afflicted with prefrontal lobe injuries during adulthood--such as insensitivity to others, unresponsiveness to behavioral interventions, and inability to follow through with plans--they were more seriously afected, as evidenced by their inability to shape a moral issue.

 . . . Furthermore, efforts to educate them about morality and changes in behavior were unsuccessful.  This suggested that whatever capacity the subjects may have possessedbefore birth had been wiped out irreparably by their injuries.


Source type: Book
Hardwired Behavior: What neuroscience revels about morality
by Laurence Tancredi
Page 78-79
Published by Cambridge University Press , Cambridge , 2005
http://
Contribution #1682

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Source type: Book
Hardwired Behavior: What neuroscience revels about morality
by Laurence Tancredi
Page 78-79
Published by Cambridge University Press , Cambridge , 2005
http://
Contribution #1682


excerpt from Hardwired Behavior
Tancredi describes the concept of neuroplasticity and how it relates to moral decline or growth. 
Being moral . . . isn't easy.  This is why moral training--early and often--is essential.  Our brain structures are not immutable; they are susceptible to change for the better and change for the worse.  What's important is what happens deep down at the level of the neuron -- in a process called neuroplasticity.  By neuroplasticity we mean the ability of neurons at the synapses to forge new connections, thereby essentially bringing about a rewiring of the brain (35). 

Neuroplasticity results not only in the setting down of new pathways through the cortex, but also the remodeling of neural networks (36).  A famous example of this is the case of the "amblyopic" kitten. We know that if we cover one of a kitten's eyes just after birth, at a certain point in time removing the patch will not result in the kitten seeing out of that eye.  External stimulation is necessary early in the life of the animal for the nerves of the eyes to develop and make critical connections in the ophthalmic cortex.  When this does not occur by a particular time, the kitten has permanently lost the ability to see out of that eye.  The nerves form alternative pathways.  This work was part of the Nobel Prize-winning research of David Hubel and Thorsten Weisel.

Going down the dangerous route with drugs, gambling, sex, or other addictions is a matter of neuroplasticity.  What often starts off as an innocent experiment--drinking alcohol, or smoking pot--can develop over time into compulsive, addictive behavior.  The brain changes, adapts because of the development of new circuitry, and induces more and more of the bad behavior.  

I remember in the late 1970's walking across Washington Square in Manhattan, when I saw a man in his early twenties with a glass cylinder about one inch in diameter through a hole in his earlobe.  I was struck by the capacity of the earlobe to stretch and allow such a large hole to develop.  I realized that it took time to go from a pinprick to an inch in diameter.  The metaphor of this struck home.

 . . . The good news:  Just as finding oneself down the moral tubes is a matter of neuroplasticity, so is etting up again and shucking off the bad habits that can destroy one's career and relationships and possibly result in serious antisocial acts.  Neuroplasticity is what we can use to build moral strength through positive experiences and training.  Unless we are one of those with a serious biological defect--genetic or acquired--our brains are able to reshape themselves at virtually any age to improve our physical and psychological conditions.  Neuroplasticity canb e our best friend if we've gone wrong and want to reform. 

excerpt from Hardwired Behavior

Being moral . . . isn't easy.  This is why moral training--early and often--is essential.  Our brain structures are not immutable; they are susceptible to change for the better and change for the worse.  What's important is what happens deep down at the level of the neuron -- in a process called neuroplasticity.  By neuroplasticity we mean the ability of neurons at the synapses to forge new connections, thereby essentially bringing about a rewiring of the brain (35). 

Neuroplasticity results not only in the setting down of new pathways through the cortex, but also the remodeling of neural networks (36).  A famous example of this is the case of the "amblyopic" kitten. We know that if we cover one of a kitten's eyes just after birth, at a certain point in time removing the patch will not result in the kitten seeing out of that eye.  External stimulation is necessary early in the life of the animal for the nerves of the eyes to develop and make critical connections in the ophthalmic cortex.  When this does not occur by a particular time, the kitten has permanently lost the ability to see out of that eye.  The nerves form alternative pathways.  This work was part of the Nobel Prize-winning research of David Hubel and Thorsten Weisel.

Going down the dangerous route with drugs, gambling, sex, or other addictions is a matter of neuroplasticity.  What often starts off as an innocent experiment--drinking alcohol, or smoking pot--can develop over time into compulsive, addictive behavior.  The brain changes, adapts because of the development of new circuitry, and induces more and more of the bad behavior.  

I remember in the late 1970's walking across Washington Square in Manhattan, when I saw a man in his early twenties with a glass cylinder about one inch in diameter through a hole in his earlobe.  I was struck by the capacity of the earlobe to stretch and allow such a large hole to develop.  I realized that it took time to go from a pinprick to an inch in diameter.  The metaphor of this struck home.

 . . . The good news:  Just as finding oneself down the moral tubes is a matter of neuroplasticity, so is etting up again and shucking off the bad habits that can destroy one's career and relationships and possibly result in serious antisocial acts.  Neuroplasticity is what we can use to build moral strength through positive experiences and training.  Unless we are one of those with a serious biological defect--genetic or acquired--our brains are able to reshape themselves at virtually any age to improve our physical and psychological conditions.  Neuroplasticity canb e our best friend if we've gone wrong and want to reform. 
Source type: Book
Hardwired Behavior: What neuroscience reveals about morality
by Laurence Tancredi
Page 43-45
Published by Cambridge University Press , Cambridge , 2005
http://
Contribution #1681

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Source type: Book
Hardwired Behavior: What neuroscience reveals about morality
by Laurence Tancredi
Page 43-45
Published by Cambridge University Press , Cambridge , 2005
http://
Contribution #1681


Making Sense
In this Age of Globalization, we need to globalize our common goals.
Our species' moniker, Homo sapiens, still eludes us, still remains our dream more than our true designation, since we are far from wise. So, for the nonce, I propose a more accurate taxonomy: Homo cogitator, or whatever would be the proper Latin for “Man the Rationalizer” or “Man the Sense Maker,” because, above all, we are driven to make sense of everything, to resolve the infinite mysteries we perceive and to master the unknown.

We are Man the Unceasing Seeker but, even more, Man the Sense Maker because our craving for certainty drives us to formulations and conclusions that sate our hunger even if they fail to nourish us. Sometimes we even find ourselves, like starving children in Haiti, eating mud cakes instead of bread, when there’s no truth to be had, only simulacra.

Thus have we worshiped false idols and proclaimed phony theories throughout our history, ideas now exploded by better evidence and keener reasoning. But we have not left all such foolishness behind, nor have all of us now alive arrived at the same degree of clarity as our foremost seekers have attained. And most if not all of us remain but partially enlightened and unwise.

To make better and better sense of things is our calling as a species, and that vocation is imperative since the power of our knowledge now allows us to destroy ourselves unless we are tempered by wiser reckonings. We must root out our foolish fallacies, our spurious beliefs, and our toxic ideologies leading us toward Armageddon and the holocaust of Earth.

The Parliament of the World’s Religions, after more than 100 years of existence, has produced a noble document, The Global Ethic, that remains more wishful than irresistible in its propositions. Thus more must be done to reconcile conflicting convictions, deep-seated belief systems that now imperil our survival.

In this Age of Globalization, we need to globalize our common goals. We need a worldwide Parliament of Good Sense working to establish fundamental principles for all human beings to live by in civilized accord.

Let us make that so.

Making Sense

Our species' moniker, Homo sapiens, still eludes us, still remains our dream more than our true designation, since we are far from wise. So, for the nonce, I propose a more accurate taxonomy: Homo cogitator, or whatever would be the proper Latin for “Man the Rationalizer” or “Man the Sense Maker,” because, above all, we are driven to make sense of everything, to resolve the infinite mysteries we perceive and to master the unknown.

We are Man the Unceasing Seeker but, even more, Man the Sense Maker because our craving for certainty drives us to formulations and conclusions that sate our hunger even if they fail to nourish us. Sometimes we even find ourselves, like starving children in Haiti, eating mud cakes instead of bread, when there’s no truth to be had, only simulacra.

Thus have we worshiped false idols and proclaimed phony theories throughout our history, ideas now exploded by better evidence and keener reasoning. But we have not left all such foolishness behind, nor have all of us now alive arrived at the same degree of clarity as our foremost seekers have attained. And most if not all of us remain but partially enlightened and unwise.

To make better and better sense of things is our calling as a species, and that vocation is imperative since the power of our knowledge now allows us to destroy ourselves unless we are tempered by wiser reckonings. We must root out our foolish fallacies, our spurious beliefs, and our toxic ideologies leading us toward Armageddon and the holocaust of Earth.

The Parliament of the World’s Religions, after more than 100 years of existence, has produced a noble document, The Global Ethic, that remains more wishful than irresistible in its propositions. Thus more must be done to reconcile conflicting convictions, deep-seated belief systems that now imperil our survival.

In this Age of Globalization, we need to globalize our common goals. We need a worldwide Parliament of Good Sense working to establish fundamental principles for all human beings to live by in civilized accord.

Let us make that so.

Source type: Website
Alan Nordstrom
"Alan Nordstrom's Blog"
http://alan-nordstrom.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2008-05-10T04%3A29%3A00-07%3A00&max-results=7
Viewed on June 13, 2008
Contribution #1490

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Source type: Website
Alan Nordstrom
"Alan Nordstrom's Blog"
http://alan-nordstrom.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2008-05-10T04%3A29%3A00-07%3A00&max-results=7
Viewed on June 13, 2008
Contribution #1490


Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior
This abstract from the Annual Review of Psychology calls attention to a research review that focuses on negative emotions (shame, embarrassment and guilt) and positive emotions (elevation, gratitude and pride) that--together with empathy--support moral behavior
Moral emotions represent a key element of our human moral apparatus, influencing the link between moral standards and moral behavior. This chapter reviews current theory and research on moral emotions. We first focus on a triad of negatively valenced “self-conscious” emotions—shame, guilt, and embarrassment. As in previous decades, much research remains focused on shame and guilt. We review current thinking on the distinction between shame and guilt, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of these two moral emotions. Several new areas of research are highlighted: research on the domain-specific phenomenon of body shame, styles of coping with shame, psychobiological aspects of shame, the link between childhood abuse and later proneness to shame, and the phenomena of vicarious or “collective” experiences of shame and guilt. In recent years, the concept of moral emotions has been expanded to include several positive emotions—elevation, gratitude, and the sometimes morally relevant experience of pride. Finally, we discuss briefly a morally relevant emotional process—other-oriented empathy.

Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior

Moral emotions represent a key element of our human moral apparatus, influencing the link between moral standards and moral behavior. This chapter reviews current theory and research on moral emotions. We first focus on a triad of negatively valenced “self-conscious” emotions—shame, guilt, and embarrassment. As in previous decades, much research remains focused on shame and guilt. We review current thinking on the distinction between shame and guilt, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of these two moral emotions. Several new areas of research are highlighted: research on the domain-specific phenomenon of body shame, styles of coping with shame, psychobiological aspects of shame, the link between childhood abuse and later proneness to shame, and the phenomena of vicarious or “collective” experiences of shame and guilt. In recent years, the concept of moral emotions has been expanded to include several positive emotions—elevation, gratitude, and the sometimes morally relevant experience of pride. Finally, we discuss briefly a morally relevant emotional process—other-oriented empathy.
Source type: Periodical
Annual Review of Psychology
Page 345-372
Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior
Volume: 58
http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070145?prevSearch=articletitlefield%3A%28moral+emotions%29&cookieSet=1&journalCode=psych
Contribution #1132

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Source type: Periodical
Annual Review of Psychology
Page 345-372
Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior
Volume: 58
http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070145?prevSearch=articletitlefield%3A%28moral+emotions%29&cookieSet=1&journalCode=psych
Contribution #1132


Born to Be Moral
Psychologist Mark Hauser and others liken morality to our innate sense of grammar.  In other words, at the heart of human moral codes lie common rules and features that come hard-wired at birth.
The idea that we have an innate sense of right and wrong has been brought to prominence again by the Harvard University cognitive psychologist Marc Hauser, with the publication of his book, Moral Minds.  He likens morality to language and its innate core to our innate sense of grammar.  IN other words, at the heart of human moral codes lie common rules and features that come hard-wired at birth. 

Hauser suggests that each culture and generation learns to interpret the moral grammar slightly differently, but the rules, fixed in the biology of the brain, remain the same. 

One reason he believes this is that the origins of morality, altruism and fair play can be seen in our group-living primate cousins, in behaviours such as loyalty to kin, intolerance of theft and punishment of cheats. 

Another reason is that moral decisions are made intuitively, rather than consciously or rationally.  People come up with similar answers when faced with a particular moral dilemma, yet Hauser and his colleagues have shown that their reasoning to justify their answers is variable and inconsistent, suggesting it is done after the choice has already been made. 

They also find no difference in fundamental moral choices made by thousands of people of different faiths and none in answer to questionnaires posing moral dilemmas.  This suggests that inbuilt morality is independent of learned religious codes.

Undeniably, there are differences over time and cultures in attitudes towards issues such as slavery, racism, capital punishment and abortion.  Even so, Hauser argues, the innate sense remains the same; it is the interpretation that changes.

So how is morality hard-wired into our brains?  The consensus among brain scientists is that emotions such as fear, guilt and pride are vitally important.

Jonathan Haidt from the University of Virginia used a hypnosis experiment to show how important emotions are.  Under hypnosis, he induced people to feel disgust when they heard a couple of arbitrary words.  When these words later came up in connection with moral dilemmas, the subjects judged certain scenarios to be wrong when people who had not been hypnotised did not.  When asked to justify their choices, they could not do so to the researchers' satisfaction.  Without knowing how or why, their emotions had altered their sense of right and wrong.

Brain-scanning studies have shown a link between damage to the brain regions that house the social emotions and a tendency to make aberrant moral choices.  Still, there is more to morality than emotion.  Most researchers now think that emotions influence the way our moral decisions are turned into actions or choices, rather than how the decisions are made in the first place.  Other brain regions involved in empathy and attributing beliefs about intentions are important. 

Born to Be Moral

The idea that we have an innate sense of right and wrong has been brought to prominence again by the Harvard University cognitive psychologist Marc Hauser, with the publication of his book, Moral Minds.  He likens morality to language and its innate core to our innate sense of grammar.  IN other words, at the heart of human moral codes lie common rules and features that come hard-wired at birth. 

Hauser suggests that each culture and generation learns to interpret the moral grammar slightly differently, but the rules, fixed in the biology of the brain, remain the same. 

One reason he believes this is that the origins of morality, altruism and fair play can be seen in our group-living primate cousins, in behaviours such as loyalty to kin, intolerance of theft and punishment of cheats. 

Another reason is that moral decisions are made intuitively, rather than consciously or rationally.  People come up with similar answers when faced with a particular moral dilemma, yet Hauser and his colleagues have shown that their reasoning to justify their answers is variable and inconsistent, suggesting it is done after the choice has already been made. 

They also find no difference in fundamental moral choices made by thousands of people of different faiths and none in answer to questionnaires posing moral dilemmas.  This suggests that inbuilt morality is independent of learned religious codes.

Undeniably, there are differences over time and cultures in attitudes towards issues such as slavery, racism, capital punishment and abortion.  Even so, Hauser argues, the innate sense remains the same; it is the interpretation that changes.

So how is morality hard-wired into our brains?  The consensus among brain scientists is that emotions such as fear, guilt and pride are vitally important.

Jonathan Haidt from the University of Virginia used a hypnosis experiment to show how important emotions are.  Under hypnosis, he induced people to feel disgust when they heard a couple of arbitrary words.  When these words later came up in connection with moral dilemmas, the subjects judged certain scenarios to be wrong when people who had not been hypnotised did not.  When asked to justify their choices, they could not do so to the researchers' satisfaction.  Without knowing how or why, their emotions had altered their sense of right and wrong.

Brain-scanning studies have shown a link between damage to the brain regions that house the social emotions and a tendency to make aberrant moral choices.  Still, there is more to morality than emotion.  Most researchers now think that emotions influence the way our moral decisions are turned into actions or choices, rather than how the decisions are made in the first place.  Other brain regions involved in empathy and attributing beliefs about intentions are important. 
Source type: Periodical
New Scientist
Page 34
Is God Good?
by Helen Phillips
Volume: 2619
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/being-human/mg19526190.400-what-good-is-god.html
Contribution #929

Source (click to close)

Source type: Periodical
New Scientist
Page 34
Is God Good?
by Helen Phillips
Volume: 2619
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/being-human/mg19526190.400-what-good-is-god.html
Contribution #929


Why is Universal Ethics Important to Nurturing Compassion?
We all want to increase compassion and peace in the world.  But our efforts will be hampered by tribalism unless we can identify and elevate the core ethical principles that transcend the boundaries of our traditions. 

The focus of Seeds of Compassion is to instill a spirit of tolerance awareness and mutual understanding at an early age through the work of families, spiritual/religious/community leaders, teachers, and all other social institutions and/or individuals who have an impact on the formation of young minds and hearts.

I am sure that many brilliant and dedicated efforts will emerge as a direct consequence of the awareness, wisdom and dialogues produced by this world-wide event.

There is plenty of merit, of course, in every project which is associated with compassion, mutual understanding and tolerance.

We would be deluded to think that by constructing activities which promote the abstract idea of universal compassion we can resolve the deeper problems posed by mutually exclusive or keenly tribal metaphysical interpretations of what we lovingly (albeit sometimes naively) label as a common spiritual goal.

More specifically, it would be not so significant if we managed to get children to participate in a particular ‘compassion awareness' project whilst his or her religious/ethnical/cultural beliefs implicitly or explicitly point to separatist behaviors (chauvinism, justification of violence, arrogance, judgment, tribalism, etc.). It would be like fixing a worn out pair of shoes by wrapping them in glittering paper.

The point is that Universal Ethics need to be the foundation upon which we can build all these projects. Otherwise it is very possible that the solid tree which many community leaders will help to grow with the Seeds of Compassion and other efforts will collapse when the first storm arrives, since the roots have not been suitably cared for and given fertile enough soil.

This is not a new realization, of course. Something very similar to the development Universal Ethics (although in an entirely different context) was tried in 2002 by the late Pope John Paul II in Assisi, where leaders of all the most important religions assembled to produce the unfortunately not so famous Decalogue of Assisi, which was sent to all world leaders in the form of a letter signed by JPII.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama wrote a pivotal book on the subject called Ethics for the New Millennium. I have read it several times and have found it to be an invaluable resource for understanding what Universal Ethics would be like.

Let me be clear: I am not proposing here that we should somehow use the aforementioned book as a blueprint for the development of Universal Ethics. It is obvious that a diversity of religious and spiritual leaders is necessary to provide maximum credibility and coverage.

Finally I want to point out that the development and application of Universal Ethics will also be able to capture the spirit and the inclination of many secular individuals. I am talking about the increasing number of independent thinkers and humanists who are very resistant to the idea of blindly embracing any given existing faith, but feel strongly about upholding universal moral principles. These people (very much like myself) have no support whatsoever. Some of the best examples of already existing universal secular values (although not formally universalized) are concerns about the violations of human rights, concerns about the health of our environment, overpopulation, and, of course, the recognition of equality of all human beings: this, I believe, must be stressed because it is the very precondition for developing compassion.

Why is Universal Ethics Important to Nurturing Compassion?

The focus of Seeds of Compassion is to instill a spirit of tolerance awareness and mutual understanding at an early age through the work of families, spiritual/religious/community leaders, teachers, and all other social institutions and/or individuals who have an impact on the formation of young minds and hearts.

I am sure that many brilliant and dedicated efforts will emerge as a direct consequence of the awareness, wisdom and dialogues produced by this world-wide event.

There is plenty of merit, of course, in every project which is associated with compassion, mutual understanding and tolerance.

We would be deluded to think that by constructing activities which promote the abstract idea of universal compassion we can resolve the deeper problems posed by mutually exclusive or keenly tribal metaphysical interpretations of what we lovingly (albeit sometimes naively) label as a common spiritual goal.

More specifically, it would be not so significant if we managed to get children to participate in a particular ‘compassion awareness' project whilst his or her religious/ethnical/cultural beliefs implicitly or explicitly point to separatist behaviors (chauvinism, justification of violence, arrogance, judgment, tribalism, etc.). It would be like fixing a worn out pair of shoes by wrapping them in glittering paper.

The point is that Universal Ethics need to be the foundation upon which we can build all these projects. Otherwise it is very possible that the solid tree which many community leaders will help to grow with the Seeds of Compassion and other efforts will collapse when the first storm arrives, since the roots have not been suitably cared for and given fertile enough soil.

This is not a new realization, of course. Something very similar to the development Universal Ethics (although in an entirely different context) was tried in 2002 by the late Pope John Paul II in Assisi, where leaders of all the most important religions assembled to produce the unfortunately not so famous Decalogue of Assisi, which was sent to all world leaders in the form of a letter signed by JPII.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama wrote a pivotal book on the subject called Ethics for the New Millennium. I have read it several times and have found it to be an invaluable resource for understanding what Universal Ethics would be like.

Let me be clear: I am not proposing here that we should somehow use the aforementioned book as a blueprint for the development of Universal Ethics. It is obvious that a diversity of religious and spiritual leaders is necessary to provide maximum credibility and coverage.

Finally I want to point out that the development and application of Universal Ethics will also be able to capture the spirit and the inclination of many secular individuals. I am talking about the increasing number of independent thinkers and humanists who are very resistant to the idea of blindly embracing any given existing faith, but feel strongly about upholding universal moral principles. These people (very much like myself) have no support whatsoever. Some of the best examples of already existing universal secular values (although not formally universalized) are concerns about the violations of human rights, concerns about the health of our environment, overpopulation, and, of course, the recognition of equality of all human beings: this, I believe, must be stressed because it is the very precondition for developing compassion.

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